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INTRODUCTION
I teach an introductory copyright course at the University of Chicago Law School, and, in that course, I find myself repeatedly talking
about evidence. I talk about the obvious evidentiary topics, for example, the elements required to establish a prima facie case of infringement and the various limitations on the use of expert testimony. But I
also talk about evidence in many settings where evidentiary issues
might not readily come to mind.
For instance, it is now well accepted that a work of authorship
must show at least a modicum of creativity in order to qualify for
1
copyright protection. Students typically find this requirement intuitive. Novels, plays, and musical compositions are at the core of copyright, after all, so naturally some bit of creativity is required. I nevertheless ask my students to defend creativity as a legal, as opposed to
artistic, threshold—in essence, asking them to explain why a welldesigned copyright regime would exclude works that lack creative
spark. That conversation inevitably leads toward a discussion of evidence.

1.

The origins of this requirement are discussed infra Part I.
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Of course, no one starts there. The first responses typically come
from students who argue that copyright favors creative work because
uncreative work is not valuable to society. Obviously copyright excludes run-of-the-mill expression, these students tell me; why incur
the costs of administering a complex legal regime with respect to
worthless work? The class usually accepts this argument for a few
minutes, but then someone offers an example of an uncreative yet
valuable work and the argument begins to unravel. The phone book
lacks creative spirit, but telephone listings certainly serve an important function in society. In fact, a creatively organized phone book—
say, one organized by the named party’s height—would likely be less
valuable than a traditional, alphabetical one. Databases similarly are
often uncreative but valuable. The Kelley Blue Book greatly assists
purchasers of used cars by gathering information about the market
value of various vehicles, but it is definitely not the kind of book that
makes for interesting bedtime reading. The American Bone Marrow
Donor Registry similarly lacks imagination but nonetheless performs
a valuable service.
Rejecting the idea that creativity is a filter for social value, the
class traditionally turns next to an argument about costs. Maybe the
reason why copyright excludes uncreative work is that uncreative
work is inexpensive to create. There is no point in incurring the costs
of the copyright regime with respect to works that are cheap to create,
the class tells me this time; even without protection, firms and individuals would still find it worthwhile to produce inexpensive work.
This argument falls more quickly than the first, mainly because the
same examples that debunk the social value theory serve to undermine the cost theory as well. There are significant up-front costs associated with compiling new phone books and researching new databases. Thus, while it is true that uncreative expression is sometimes
cheap to produce, that is not true across the board, and, overall, there
is no reason to think that creativity is a particularly good proxy for
production costs. Uncreative work can be expensive (think databases), and creative work can be cheap to produce (think romance
novels).
The arguments from here get more sophisticated. For example,
sometimes students suggest that copyright excludes uncreative work
as a way of encouraging authors to focus on creative work. Increasing
the reward for uncreative work might distract authors, causing them
to spend more time developing dictionaries and databases and less
time writing Moby Dick and Canterbury Tales. This distraction argu-
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ment does have appeal in certain instances, but, like the previous arguments, this one seems too narrow to justify a broad rule against uncreative work. For starters, it is hard to imagine that Mark Twain was
torn between working on the phone book or penning American classics. A change in the legal regime might affect the decisions made by
investors, publishers, and similar business entities, then, but it would
probably not much impact the decisions made by authors themselves.
Framed that way, of course, the argument is not particularly strong. If
legal rules were to change so as to make any business less attractive—
from cattle ranching to, yes, database production—that would, at the
margin, slightly increase the allure associated with investments in
creative expression. Yet surely no one argues against federal farm
subsidies on the ground that a more precarious cattle industry would
lead to better Hollywood scripts. Just the same, while the argument is
a little stronger as applied to database production, it does not seem all
that compelling unless (again) uncreative expression either is of extremely low social value or is extremely inexpensive to produce.2
Note that, during the conversation in which all of these hypotheses are in turn brought forward and rejected, my class is inevitably
forced to admit that creativity is a hopelessly subjective standard.
When considering whether creativity is a proxy for social value, for
example, students naturally offer what they believe to be no-brainer
examples of uncreative work. Yet, in every case, at least someone in
the room disagrees with the example as offered. Is Piet Mondrian’s
painting Composition with Yellow Patch really a work of creative art,
or is it just a few ordinary squares painted in black with one small
patch of yellow? Can Campbell’s Soup cans ever be anything more
than boring cupboard material? As Justice Holmes said in an earlier
era, it is “a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only [in] the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”3
But then I point the class back to an explanation tied to something judges are quite competent to evaluate: evidence. My argument
is simple. If the copyright system were to recognize rights in uncreative work, courts would be overwhelmed by difficult evidentiary disputes. Two parties would come forward with remarkably similar

2. For further elaboration on this point in the patent context, see Douglas G. Lichtman,
The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693, 717–18
(1997).
3. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
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works of authorship, and the court would find it virtually impossible
to determine whether one copied from the other (impermissible infringement) or whether, instead, any similarity between the works
was just a natural outgrowth of the fact that both works lack creativity. Ask four college students to create a directory of Asian restaurants in Chicago and, whether they copy or not, the four will likely
produce markedly similar directories. A creativity requirement, then,
empowers courts to exclude from the copyright system a particularly
messy class of cases: those in which courts would not be able to use
similarity as the basis for even a weak inference regarding the likelihood of impermissible copying.
This argument applies specifically to copyright’s creativity requirement. As I unfold more fully in this Article, however, similar
evidentiary concerns help to explain many of copyright law’s central
doctrines. Why does federal law require that a work be fixed in some
4
stable form before protection will begin? Or deny protection in cases
where there are only a limited number of ways to express a given
5
idea? Or deny protection to descriptive details that flow naturally
from a given plot element?6 There are many reasons, it turns out, but
a principal one is that each of these doctrines helps to mitigate what
would otherwise be a difficult problem with respect to proof. In short,
copyright law is in part a rule of evidence. Many copyright doctrines
serve to exclude from the copyright regime cases where evidentiary
issues would so increase the costs of litigation that those costs would
likely outweigh the social benefits derived from offering copyright
protection in the first place.
I proceed as follows. Part I continues the discussion begun in this
Introduction, and, thus, considers the combined constitutional and
statutory requirement that a work be original. This is one of the two
main prerequisites to federal copyright protection, and it is today interpreted to mean not only that the work was not copied from another source, but also that the work demonstrates at least a modicum
of creativity. I argue that requiring creativity makes sense in part because of evidentiary concerns. That is, a sensible copyright system
would distinguish between creative and uncreative work, and one reason it would do so is because that distinction helps to identify and exclude cases that would otherwise present extreme problems of proof.
4.
5.
6.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
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Part II turns attention to the second of the two main prerequisites for federal copyright protection: the requirement that a work be
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Under current law, a work
qualifies for protection only after it has been captured in some stable
form, such as a typewritten manuscript, a video or audiotape, or even
sufficiently detailed handwritten notes. There are many possible justifications for this requirement. For instance, its purpose might be to
encourage the dissemination of creative work, the intuition being that
something captured in physical form can be passed more easily from
person to person, place to place, and generation to generation. I argue, however, that the evidence theory offers a better explanation:
extending protection to include unfixed expression—say, oral remarks—would pose extraordinary difficulties with respect to proof. In
making this argument, I explain where other justifications fall short,
and I identify some possible reforms that would help the fixation requirement to better serve an evidentiary purpose.
Part III offers a brief survey of three other copyright doctrines
on which the evidence theory sheds light. In particular, I consider the
merger doctrine, the doctrine of scènes à faire, and the federal registration procedure. Finally, the Conclusion uses the preceding analysis
to expose a larger problem facing the copyright regime, namely, that
copyright doctrines are today often used in ways largely unrelated to
their logical justifications.
I. THE CREATIVITY REQUIREMENT
In copyright, works that demonstrate a modicum of creativity are
eligible for protection, but works that lack creativity are not. Works
typically denied protection due to a lack of creativity include phone
7
8
9
10
books, food recipes, databases, and computer protocols. The ques7. E.g., BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436,
1446 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that a telephone directory publisher did not violate copyright law
“[b]y copying the name, address, telephone number, business type, and unit of advertising purchased” from another directory); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 932 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding that a publisher’s adaptation of subscriber information in the white pages of another telephone directory was “entirely typical” and not an instance of copyright infringement).
8. E.g., Publ’ns Int’l., Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding no
violation of copyright law because recipes do not contain “even a bare modicum” of creative
expression); Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 343, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (observing that information regarding the use and care of food preparatory mechanisms lacks the
requisite originality).
9. E.g., Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1520–21 (11th Cir.
1997) (observing that the method used to select communities represented in a directory of cable
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tion I address in this Part is whether these sorts of exclusions are justified. That is, I ask whether there is any good reason for federal copyright law to distinguish creative from uncreative work.
The Part proceeds in four Sections. Section A traces the origins
of the creativity requirement. As I explain, it is today widely accepted
that creativity is a constitutional requirement, although that interpretation did not take hold until the 1991 Supreme Court decision in
11
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Section B
considers standard explanations of, and justifications for, this line between creative and uncreative work. For example, some previous
commentators have argued that creative work should be favored because it is more valuable to society, while others have argued that uncreative work should be disfavored because it is inexpensive to produce. Section C articulates the evidence theory and analyzes several
criticisms thereof. A handful of courts have indicated that evidentiary
concerns drive the distinction between the creative and the uncreative. Those opinions have been sharply—and, I argue, unfairly—criticized by copyright commentators. Finally, Section D concludes with
implications, focusing in particular on cases where the modern creativity requirement is used to deny protection even though there is no
reason to do so from an evidentiary perspective.
A. Foundations
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
recognizes in Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”12 The clause is today interpreted to authorize both copyright and patent law, with “authors” and “writings” referring to copytelevision systems was not a proper subject for copyright); Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v.
Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the publisher of a radiator
catalog did not have a cause of action for copyright infringement where “only facts” were copied).
10. E.g., Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1365
(E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that “handshake protocols” allowing fax machines to communicate
with each other “lack the requisite authorship and originality” necessary to invoke copyright
protection). But see Superchips, Inc. v. St. & Performance Elecs., Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1849, 1855 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that substantial deviations from a generally accepted computer program design may involve the “sufficient quantum of originality needed to be entitled
to copyright protection”) .
11. 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
12. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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right, and “inventors” and “discoveries” referring to patent. Congress
has frequently invoked this power to promulgate federal copyright
13
statutes. The current one is the Copyright Act of 1976, although that
statute has been significantly amended in the years since 1976, in particular by the Berne Convention Implementation Act in 1989,14 and
15
by both the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act16 in 1998. Nowhere in all this statutory and constitutional language does there appear any explicit reference to creativity, however. The closest language is in section 102(a)
of the 1976 Act, which states that only “original works of authorship”
are eligible for protection.17 That phrase was left undefined in the
1976 Act, however, and the legislative history suggests that it was “intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality” that
had been previously developed by the courts.18
Just what was this previously developed standard? Unfortunately, courts had not really developed a clear standard at the time of
the 1976 Act. In fact, all that was clear back then was that, at a minimum, an eligible work had to derive in some way from the would-be
copyright claimant. A work slavishly copied from another source was
not eligible for protection. Copyright was reserved only for “origina19
tor[s]” and “maker[s]”; “he to whom anything owes its origin.” This
was an originality requirement not in the sense of requiring “fresh20
ness of aspect, design, or style,” but rather in the more literal sense
of requiring that the work at issue originate with the author in question. Originality of this sort was a foundational principle. As the Second Circuit stated in 1976, “‘the one pervading . . . prerequisite to

13. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (amending 17 U.S.C.).
14. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (eliminating and simplifying many copyright
formalities).
15. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(amending scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (increasing copyright duration).
16. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (amending scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (limiting indirect liability for certain types of online activities
and introducing new prohibitions against the circumvention of copyright management technologies).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
18. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.
19. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
20. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 820 (10th ed. 1996).
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copyright protection’ . . . is the requirement of originality—that the
21
work be the original product of the claimant.”
Beyond this one aspect, the originality standard as of 1976 was
murky at best. The trouble came in articulating what it meant to say
that a work originated with a particular author. No expression is
completely the independent work of its author; every author to some
degree builds upon the work of those who have come before. Thus,
courts had to further define originality in such a way as to distinguish
permissible from impermissible evolution. Was it enough if an author
made significant contributions of time, skill, or expense? Did originality presuppose a minimum level of artistic achievement or creative
effort? These questions were not easily resolved, and it was in the
struggle to answer them that courts first began to distinguish uncreative works from works that exhibit some degree of imagination, vision, or spark.
One of the earliest and most influential opinions on point was
22
the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Trade-Mark Cases. The opinion
was a consolidated response to several appeals, all asking that specific
trademark violations be excused on the ground that federal trademark law was beyond Congress’ constitutional powers. In analyzing
the case, one of the arguments the Court had to address was the government’s contention that the constitutional language authorizing
copyright law could be read to authorize trademark law as well. The
Court rejected this argument.23
The relevant analysis is only a paragraph in length, and it contains no citations to any history, document, or lower court decision.
The thrust of the passage is that there are important distinctions to be
drawn between constitutionally protected “writings” on the one hand
and mere trademarks on the other. Writings, the Court explains, are
“founded in the creative powers of the mind” and are the “fruits of
24
intellectual labor.” Trademarks are “often the result of accident
rather than design” and can be “something already in existence.”25 A
writing results from “novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the

21. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489–90 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 10, at 32 (1975)).
22. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
23. Id. at 82.
24. Id. at 94.
25. Id.
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26

brain.” A trademark, by contrast, requires “no fancy or imagination,
no genius, no laborious thought,” just the use of a word or symbol in
27
commerce.
What all this meant for copyright’s creativity requirement was
unclear. In some sentences, the Court seemed to be saying nothing
more than what other courts had said and would continue to say
about “authorship”: copyright requires, at a minimum, that a wouldbe author make a nontrivial contribution to the work at issue. This
was the difference between writings and trademarks; writings had to
be the work of their authors, but trademarks could be plucked from
existing words and symbols. In other sentences, however, the Court
seemed to require something more, distinguishing trademarks on the
ground that they lack “imagination” and “genius,” and thus seemingly
implying that copyright-eligible works must demonstrate these qualities. If this was what the Court had in mind, note that these extra requirements were being tied to the constitutional word “writings,” and
not to the constitutional word “authors” or to any language from the
copyright statute in effect at the time of the case.
The Supreme Court revisited these issues a few years later in
28
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony. At issue was a photograph
of the playwright Oscar Wilde. The photographer had posed Wilde,
adjusted the background lighting, chosen Wilde’s wardrobe, and ultimately operated the camera that captured Wilde’s image.29 The defendant—in court because he had made an unauthorized lithograph
based on the photo—argued that these many activities did not
amount to authorship for constitutional purposes: “[A] photograph is
the mere mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines
of some object animate or inanimate, and involves no originality of
thought, or any novelty in the intellectual operation connected with
its visible reproduction in shape of a picture.”30 The implication was
that photographers were not authors, and Congress therefore did not
31
have the constitutional authority to protect photographs.

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
29. Id. at 55.
30. Id. at 59.
31. The defendant also argued that a photograph could not be a “writing” for constitutional purposes; that term was supposedly limited to include only items such as books and pamphlets that are literally written by an author. Id. at 57. The Court rejected this argument, stating
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As a technical matter, the Burrow-Giles Court did not address
this argument. The photograph of Wilde was not some mechanical
rendering completely devoid of “originality of thought” or “novelty in
the intellectual operation.” Quite the opposite, the trial court had
found as a matter of fact that the photograph was “useful, new, [and]
harmonious,” and that the “plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from
32
his own original mental conception.” Some photographs might lack
these indicia of originality, and those would pose a more difficult
question. But that was not the case before the Court, and the Court
therefore refused to speak to the issue. “On the question as thus
stated we decide nothing,” wrote Mr. Justice Miller for a unanimous
Court, refusing to answer the hypothetical question of what would
have happened had the photograph been a “mere mechanical reproduction.”33
In dicta, however, the Burrow-Giles Court expressed doubt that
any fair interpretation of the constitutional language could make
creativity or artistic accomplishment a prerequisite to copyright protection. As the Court pointed out, the first Congress of the United
States, “sitting immediately after the formation of the Constitution,”
had passed a copyright act that explicitly included within its purview
34
maps and charts as well as books. By any definition, these were
works of negligible creativity, yet in 1790 Congress deemed them eligible for copyright. “The construction placed upon the Constitution . . . by the men who were contemporary with its formation, many
of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself
entitled to very great weight.”35
In 1903, the Supreme Court again spoke on the issue of what an
author had to contribute in order to produce work eligible for copyright protection, this time in the case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho36
graphing Co. The plaintiff had produced a series of lithographs rep-

that the term should be read broadly and noting that photographs did not even exist at the time
the constitutional language was written. Id. at 57–58.
32. Id. at 54–55 (discussing, but not formally citing, trial court findings).
33. Id. at 59.
34. Id. at 56. The word “charts” likely referred to navigational charts, the creation of which
was obviously a priority during the nation’s early years.
35. Id. at 57. Professor Jane Ginsburg offers a rich account of this history and its implications in her article, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1873–93 (1990).
36. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
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37
resenting images from the circus. There was some dispute as to how
similar the images were to the various real-life circus acts depicted,
but, importantly, the Court held that this detail was not relevant to
the issue of copyright eligibility. “Even if [the lithographs] had been
drawn from the life,” wrote the majority, the resulting images would
still be the “personal reaction” of the individual who created them
and, as such, eligible for protection.38 “Personality always contains
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting,
and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which
is one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a
restriction in the words of the [federal statute.]”39 Thus, while the
Trade-Mark Cases and many lower court opinions had seemed to flirt
with the idea that the Constitution requires more than mere origination—“fancy,”40 “imagination,”41 “genius,”42 “laborious thought”43—in
Bleistein, as in the dicta of Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court seemed
ready to accept almost any contribution as sufficient.
Lower courts over the next many years understandably wavered
between requiring creativity and suggesting that any nontrivial contribution could suffice. Consider, for example, two prominent and
contemporaneous Second Circuit decisions: Chamberlin v. Uris Sales
44
45
Corp. and Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. In Chamberlin, the Second Circuit evaluated a game board similar to that used
46
for the game backgammon. The court focused on creativity, explicitly stating that “the Constitution does not authorize [copyright] to
one whose product lacks all creative originality.”47 The opinion was
light in terms of its detail or reasoning, but it did seem to follow the
language of the Trade-Mark Cases, rather than the looser requirements articulated in Burrow-Giles and Bleistein.
Just six years later, however, the Second Circuit changed course.
The new case was Alfred Bell, and at issue was a set of engravings de-

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 248.
Id. at 249–50.
Id. at 250.
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
Id.
Id.
Id.
150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945).
191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
150 F.2d at 512.
Id. at 513.
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48

signed to mimic several preexisting oil paintings. The engravings had
been carved with great skill and meticulous care, but their basic purpose and effect was simply to reproduce the original images. The
question was whether, on balance, this was adequate originality for
copyright purposes. The Second Circuit held that it was. “All that is
needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
‘author’ contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation,
something recognizably his own. Originality in this context means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.”49
The Second Circuit went on to say that the aforementioned
more-than-trivial variation could be completely accidental. Bad eyesight or “a shock caused by a clap of thunder” could yield authorship
in the constitutional sense, despite the obvious lack of any intentional
50
mental process. The contrast between Chamberlin and Alfred Bell
was thus dramatic. In Chamberlin, it was “obvious” to the Second
Circuit that the “Constitution does not authorize such a monopoly
grant to one whose product lacks all creative originality.”51 A scant six
years later, copyright was available no “matter how poor artistically
the ‘author’s’ addition,” so long as “it be his own.”52
Outside the Second Circuit, things were not any clearer, as courts
throughout the country struggled to articulate what it was that the
Constitution implicitly required. One popular approach was to deem
the constitutional demand satisfied by significant effort—“sweat of
the brow”—even in the absence of other touchstones. In Toksvig v.
53
Bruce Publishing Co., for example, the plaintiff had invested considerable effort researching a biography of Hans Christian Anderson;
there were flights to Denmark, interviews with people who knew Andersen at various stages of life, translations of information from Danish to English, and so on.54 After the biography came out, another
author decided to write a biography of Andersen as well. But instead
of researching Andersen herself or negotiating a license with the first
author, the second author just took what she needed from the earlier
48. 191 F.2d at 99.
49. Id. at 102–03.
50. Id. at 105; cf. Florabelle Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304, 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“The accidental or laboriously contrived creation, if it qualifies objectively, is
doubtless enough.”).
51. 150 F.2d at 513.
52. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103.
53. 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
54. Id. at 666.
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55
work and used it as her own. This, to the Toksvig Court, was copy56
right infringement. The plaintiff’s significant efforts gave him rights
in his resulting research. Another biographer could rediscover those
facts or strike a bargain with the original biographer, but blatant unauthorized copying was not to be permitted.57
Not all courts thought labor sufficient to meet the constitutional
requirement, however. An influential opinion on this side of the debate was the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Miller v. Universal City Studios,
58
Inc. At issue this time were the facts associated with the 1968 kidnapping of a college-aged girl. The plaintiff had worked with the victim to gather the facts of her story and had written a book revealing
those details. The defendant allegedly used the book without permission to develop a made-for-television movie.59 Assuming for the purposes of appeal that the book did indeed require significant effort in
its production, the Miller court considered whether significant research efforts alone could make a work eligible for copyright. The
60
court held that they could not.
The Miller court was very careful to note that it was not basing its
decision on policy, but was instead following what it thought to be
61
unavoidable limitations inherent in copyright law. Specifically, the
court read Burrow-Giles to require that “an ‘author’ is one ‘to whom
anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a
work of science or literature.’”62 And the Miller court refused to believe that a fact could “originate” with a person, even one who put in
significant efforts to uncover it. “The discoverer merely finds and records. He may not claim that the facts are ‘original’ with him.”63 Note
that the panel did seem to understand the possible argument on the
other side. The majority opinion explicitly points out that the court

55. Id.
56. Id. at 667.
57. Id.
58. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
59. Id. at 1367.
60. Id. at 1372.
61. Id. at 1369 (“The issue is not whether granting copyright protection to an author’s research would be desirable or beneficial, but whether such protection is intended under the copyright law.”).
62. Id. at 1368 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
63. Id. at 1368 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03(E), at 2–
34 (1980)).
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below had focused on “time and money” as the basis for the plaintiff’s
64
claim.
Debates about the various metrics for measuring authorship
might have continued indefinitely but for the Supreme Court’s 1991
65
ruling in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
There, the Supreme Court held that creativity was an absolute prerequisite to copyright protection.66 Time, effort, and expense were not
enough, nor was skill, nor, presumably, those random variations
caused by bad eyesight or claps of thunder. The necessary element—
implicit in the constitutional words “authors” and “writings”—was
creativity.
The facts in Feist were straightforward. Rural was a local telephone company and, in the course of providing telephone service, it
67
had assigned telephone numbers to its various subscribers. Rural
published that information in the form of two telephone directories,
an alphabetically organized White Pages, and a Yellow Pages that
was organized by category.68 Feist, meanwhile, was not a telephone
company, but it also published telephone directories.69 For one of
them, it wanted to list Rural’s customers in addition to listing tele70
phone customers served by other local firms. Rural refused to license this use of its directory, however, so Feist sent employees to
71
gather the relevant information anew. Feist ultimately independently confirmed approximately 3,600 of the 4,935 entries it needed,
but it then copied the remaining entries directly from Rural’s telephone books.72 Rural sued for copyright infringement.73
The Supreme Court rejected Rural’s copyright claim, reasoning
that what Feist took was not protected expression. To qualify for protection, the Court explained, a work must be original. And original,
64. Id. at 1369.
65. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
66. Id. at 345.
67. Id. at 343.
68. Id. at 342.
69. Id. at 342–43.
70. Id. at 343.
71. Id. at 343–44.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 344. More specifically, Rural presented two related theories. First, Rural argued
that it had created each name/number pair, and thus held copyright in each and every listing.
Second, Rural argued that it had also created the White Pages and the Yellow Pages, and thus
had earned protection for each of those compilations (taken as a whole) above and beyond any
rights in the individual entries. Id. at 361–62.
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“as that term is used in copyright, means . . . that the work was independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at least some
74
minimal degree of creativity.”
The first half of the Court’s definition echoed well-established
doctrine. For two hundred years, courts had been saying that, under
federal law, an eligible work must in some sense derive from the
would-be copyright claimant. But, as the discussion in this Section
makes clear, the second half of the Court’s definition had previously
been in considerable dispute. The Court ended that dispute with its
holding, and it did so by primarily relying on two of the Supreme
Court decisions I just introduced: the Trade-Mark Cases and BurrowGiles.
The Court read the Trade-Mark Cases to support the proposition
that the constitutional term “writings” includes only such works as
“are founded in the creative powers of the mind” and “are the fruits
75
of intellectual labor.” Those are of course accurate quotes; but in the
context of the Trade-Mark Cases, they are subject to two alternative
readings. They can be read to require creativity, or they can be read
along with other passages in the case to require more narrowly that
authors make some nontrivial contribution to the work at issue.
Without discussion, the Feist Court adopted the creativity interpretation—interestingly, adding that only a “minimal degree” of creativity
is necessary, even though the Trade-Mark Cases opinion itself contains no such qualifying language.
The Feist Court similarly read Burrow-Giles to require creativity,
albeit this time because of the constitutional word “authors.” Feist
does not quote any of the contrary language from Burrow-Giles, for
example, the passage where the Burrow-Giles Court explicitly refuses
to decide this issue,76 or the discussion where it notes that the first
federal copyright statute had extended protection to (arguably) un77
creative works like maps and charts. Instead, Feist simply quotes a
passage from Burrow-Giles that describes copyright as applying to
“original intellectual conceptions,”78 and then quotes a later section
where copyright is said to require “intellectual production . . .

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
(1884)).

Id. at 345.
Id. at 346 (quoting The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (emphasis omitted)).
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
499 U.S. at 346 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
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79
thought, and conception.” These passages, according to the Feist
Court, “emphasize[] the creative component of originality.”80
With the rule thus established, the Feist Court dutifully searched
81
Rural’s telephone listings for the required creativity. Understandably, the Court did not find it. When considering each telephone entry
in isolation, the Court put forward the proposition earlier introduced
in Miller—the idea that “facts do not owe their origin” to any par82
ticular party and thus cannot satisfy the constitutional language.
When considering the telephone books each as a whole, the Court
recognized that, in some cases, the selection and arrangement inherent in a compilation would constitute authorship for constitutional
purposes, but held that the alphabetical listings at issue were not sufficiently creative.83

B. Rationales
Copyright commentators have long endeavored to explain why a
sensible copyright regime would deny protection to uncreative work.
One theory is that uncreative work is not sufficiently valuable to society to warrant the administrative costs associated with copyright protection. Running a copyright regime is costly. The resources that the
government invests in copyright disputes surely could be used in more
productive ways; and the same is true for the resources invested by
private parties. This latter point is tricky in that private parties voluntarily invest in litigation, and so, at first blush, one might be tempted
to think that their investments must be socially efficient. But that is
not necessarily true. After all, two parties might fight over a $100 bill
found on the street, but for society that effort is pure waste, because
nothing useful is accomplished in the struggle; its effects are only distributional. Thus, there is a lot of waste associated with copyright litigation, and if uncreative works lack value, it might be in society’s in-

79. Id. at 347 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59–60).
80. 499 U.S. at 346.
81. Id. at 361–63.
82. Id. at 347.
83. Id. at 362–63. Even if the Court had deemed the phone books sufficiently original,
there would still have been some dispute over whether Feist took those original elements or,
instead, merely took the name/number pairs independent of any original arrangement that Rural might have superimposed.
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terest to minimize waste by excluding these works from the copyright
84
regime.
There are two responses to this argument, and both seem to undermine it significantly. The first is simply to question whether creativity is a good proxy for value. As I note in the Introduction to this
Article, uncreative but valuable works are common. The Kelley Blue
Book and the American Bone Marrow Donor Registry both fit that
description, as do telephone listings and legal databases like Westlaw
and Lexis. That said, some commentators apparently think creativity
is a reasonable touchstone. Judge Benjamin Kaplan, for example,
wrote in his popular copyright monograph that the creativity requirement is justified because it ensures that an author must “deposit
more than a penny” before the “copyright turnstile” will revolve.85
The second response is that, even if uncreative work does lack
value, that is not a reason to deny it copyright protection, because
copyright neither encourages the creation of valueless work, nor encourages litigation over it. The insight here is simple: copyright is not
a government-sponsored cash prize; it is instead a legal right that
makes it easier for an author to sell his intellectual wares without falling victim to freeriding rivals. Were copyright a cash prize, worries
about valueless work would make sense. The cash prize would be an
incentive to create this work and then litigate with respect to its ownership—and that would be a bad deal for society if uncreative work
were indeed valueless. But copyright is not cash and, as such, it does
not have this effect. If a work turns out to lack value, copyright or no,
the relevant author will earn only the pittance he deserves. There is
no built-in reward for copyright ownership; value, even for copyrighted work, is determined by market forces. This market check is
particularly strong for uncreative work because, almost by definition,
markets for uncreative work are vulnerable to entry. If the work is
obvious, or if it can be created with just an investment of time,
money, or labor, rivals typically will be able to make those investments and come up with substitute, competing goods. Even with
copyright protection, then, there would not be much of an incentive

84. Granted, authors of uncreative work might waste some resources even if their works
are denied copyright protection. For instance, an author denied protection might compensate by
using encryption, secrecy, and other forms of self-help. This type of waste is almost impossible
to avoid.
85. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 46 (1967).
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to create valueless work, and there would similarly not be much of an
incentive to litigate over its ownership.
A related argument sometimes offered in support of the distinction between creative and uncreative work is that uncreative work
tends to be inexpensive to produce, and therefore it does not require
legal protection. Professors L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce have
made this claim, arguing that “by correlating protection with creativity, [modern law] makes the rewards of copyright commensurate with
86
the type of effort each author puts forth.” This intuition might also
have influenced Copyright Office regulations, one of which provides
that “short phrases,” including “slogans” and “mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring,” are not eligible for
protection.87
The low-cost rationale is no more satisfying than was the lowvalue rationale, however, because uncreative work is not systematically inexpensive. As the “sweat of the brow” cases make plain, effort
itself can come at a hefty price. In fact, a critical similarity between
uncreative and creative work is that both are subject to the public
88
goods problem routinely associated with information products. That
is, in both cases, the cost to the author of producing the first embodiment can be high, but the costs to anyone of producing additional
copies based on that first embodiment are often low. The high startup
cost might be an investment in creativity, as is likely the case when an
author sets out to write a new novel or a director attempts to stage a
new movie or play. But the high startup cost might have nothing to do
with creativity, as was surely the case when a group of entrepreneurs
first set out to capture electronic versions of all federal opinions ever
86. L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 808–09 (1989). Professor Robert Denicola has similarly argued that creativity is supposed to filter out works where
little effort is involved, although Professor Denicola recognizes that creativity is probably not
very good at accomplishing this task. See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts:
A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 522 (1981)
(“The short phrase or the insubstantial variation in a public domain work does not automatically acquire creativity as the number of words or variations increases. [Situations not justifying
copyright protection] can be better ascribed to a failure to evince a minimum quantity, rather
than quality, of authorship.”).
87. Registration of Claims to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2002).
88. Public goods are goods for which one consumer’s consumption does not in any way diminish another consumer’s ability to consume. Information is a public good, and much of intellectual property law is an attempt to harness this natural benefit while at the same time ensuring
that there are adequate incentives to create and disseminate information products in the first
place.
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published, or when a group of doctors first gathered what ultimately
became the bone marrow donor registry’s lifesaving data.
Without copyright, all of these putative authors would lose
money. They would incur the relevant first-copy costs only then to see
their rivals make and sell competing copies based on the first. That
competition would drive prices down toward marginal cost, and the
initial authors would never be able to earn revenues sufficient to offset their first-copy costs. This public goods problem is the traditional
economic justification for copyright, and it applies equally well to
creative and uncreative work. It is no wonder, then, that cost-based
arguments fail to justify a distinction between these two categories.
The cost-related arguments turn out to be identical in the two set89
tings.
Another unsatisfying explanation frequently put forward to justify the distinction between creative and uncreative work simply
states that copyright is designed to reward contributions to culture.
Professor Marshall Leaffer seems to adopt this perspective, writing in
his thorough and thoughtful copyright treatise that the creativity requirement is a “quid pro quo for the copyright monopoly,” ensuring
that the law “reward[s] with a copyright only an author who has contributed to our fund of culture.”90
This argument ultimately fails for two reasons. First, as a descriptive matter, it is inconsistent with the history of copyright law—for instance, the fact that the first copyright act explicitly included maps
91
and charts, two types of work that are routinely uncreative. Second,
as a normative matter, it does not explain why cultural contributions
should be favored over other authored works. As I have already argued in this Section, cultural and uncreative works both merit protection in that both can be valuable, both can be expensive to produce,
and both are subject to a real freerider problem. To say that copyright
is meant to focus on culture is to state a conclusion, not to explain
why it is justified.
So what is the justification? Of the traditional explanations, the
most compelling is that copyright excludes uncreative work because
89. It is of course true that, in both settings, there are certain advantages to being first even
without copyright protection. The first party to create an information good might enjoy reputation benefits, for example, or might be able to sell the information product at a high price while
rivals gear up to compete. The point is merely that all of these arguments apply with equal force
to creative and uncreative work.
90. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (3d ed. 1999).
91. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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the public has a strong interest in making full use of factual information. This argument most often arises in cases like Toksvig, where an
author attempts to protect facts that have been discovered through
significant expense. Courts deny protection in these cases on the
ground that the public interest is best served by a legal regime where
facts are free for all to use. As one court asserted, “[t]o grant copyright protection [to uncreative work] would risk putting large areas of
factual research material off limits and threaten the public’s unre92
strained access to information.” Another court similarly stated that
“[t]he public interest in the free flow of information is assured by the
law’s refusal to recognize a valid copyright” in uncreative work.93 The
Supreme Court has also made this sort of argument, asserting that
“[t]he very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is
to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains,”
but that “this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not
be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.”94 Importantly, this was the rationale put forward in Feist, too: “[R]aw facts
may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It
is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and
art.”95
This sort of argument has allure, but it is subject to an important
limitation: copyright simultaneously increases and decreases the
amount of information available to the public. Copyright increases
the available information to the extent that it gives authors an added
incentive to develop and disseminate useful work. Copyright decreases the available information to the extent that it allows authors
to limit the use of information by charging a price above marginal
cost. If a court’s purpose is to increase the free flow of a particular
type of information, then, it is not by any means clear that the best
option is to deny copyright protection to that class of work. Instead,
the best option might be to increase protection, and, in that way, increase the incentive to gather and share it. Everything depends on
which of the two effects dominates, and there is certainly no reason to

92.
93.
1980).
94.
95.

Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Inv. Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986).
Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
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believe that the right answer for all or even most types of uncreative
96
work is to deny protection.
Of course, this is not to say that uncreative work raises exactly
the same incentive/access tradeoff as that raised by creative work.
Quite the opposite, one can easily distinguish uncreative from creative work along this dimension. For example, it is possible that the
public has a stronger need for access to factual rather than fictional
information, because important public policy decisions often turn on
factual data. On this argument, former President Gerald Ford should
be accorded less protection for the facts presented in his autobiography than Orson Welles receives for the creative elements inherent in
Citizen Kane. President Ford’s memoir, after all, reveals important
details about Watergate and the pardon of President Richard Nixon.97
The opposite point, however, can be made as well, namely, that the
public has a weaker need for mandatory access to factual information
than it does for fictional information because, in most cases, a second
author can invest his own time, money, and energy to independently
gather any factual information that might be of interest. On this argument, it might be harder to create a substitute for Citizen Kane
than it would be to reinvestigate the facts surrounding the crash of the
German airship Hindenburg.98 The point here is simply that, overall,
there is no reason to believe that the incentive/access tradeoff is
skewed completely to one side for uncreative work. The scope of protection should depend in part upon the nature of a given work, but
the fact that the public often values factual information certainly does
not mean that uncreative work should be left unprotected as a general rule.
C. The Evidence Theory
Up to this point, I have surveyed a number of possible explanations for, and justifications of, copyright’s distinction between creative

96. The tradeoff between incentives and access is a familiar one in intellectual property
law. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–46 (1989) (summarizing the arguments and
then applying them to the question of whether patent law should offer an experimental use exemption).
97. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (analyzing a copyright claim in President Ford’s memoirs, and noting that there is a “greater need to
disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy”).
98. Cf. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing a
copyright claim regarding the facts of the Hindenburg downing).
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and uncreative work. In particular, I have discussed the argument that
uncreative work is of particularly low social value, and, hence, is not
worth protecting; the related argument that uncreative work tends to
be inexpensive to produce, and, therefore, is also unworthy of protection; the argument that copyright is meant to focus exclusively on cultural contributions; and the argument that denying protection to uncreative work increases societal welfare by making important
information free for all to use. Only the last of these conventional explanations turns out to have significant normative appeal, although
each offers at least some insight into why uncreative work might be
excluded from the copyright regime.
Consider now the evidence theory. The basic logic is straightforward: one reason a sensible copyright regime would distinguish uncreative from creative work is that uncreative work introduces extraordinary problems of proof. Were two litigants to step forward
with remarkably similar uncreative works, a court would find it virtually impossible to determine whether one copied from the other (impermissible infringement), or whether instead any similarity simply
resulted from the fact that both works lack creativity. As mentioned
in the Introduction, if I were to ask four students to create a directory
of Asian restaurants in Chicago, the four would likely produce markedly similar directories, whether they copied or not. An originality
requirement, then, empowers courts to exclude from the copyright
system a particularly messy class of cases: cases in which courts would
not be able to use similarity as the basis for even a weak inference regarding the likelihood of impermissible copying.
A few courts have flirted with this sort of explanation for copyright’s creativity requirement. The first was the Second Circuit in L.
99
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder. At issue was a toy bank made in the
shape of the legendary patriotic figure, Uncle Sam. Banks of this sort
had long been available to the public, but they were always made out
of cast iron, whereas the one in question was made out of plastic.100
The plaintiff presented evidence designed to show that changing from
a cast iron to a plastic medium was difficult and time-consuming; and
the lower court ultimately found that “a degree of physical artistic
skill” was indeed necessary for the transformation.101 The question on

99. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
100. Id. at 488.
101. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 394 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 536 F.2d
486 (2d Cir. 1976).
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appeal, then, was whether a demonstration of this sort of “physical”
skill was sufficient for copyright purposes, or whether artistic accomplishment was the touchstone of authorship.
Surveying prior cases (including Bell, a case discussed in Part
I.A) the Batlin court found that in comparable instances works were
awarded protection only when they exhibited more than “‘merely
102
trivial’ variation[s]” from preexisting works. Unfortunately, that was
not this case. The plastic bank at issue was extraordinarily similar to
the conventional cast iron version in shape and detail. And while
there were some minor differences, the court found that those were
“functional”—that is, they were changes made to accommodate the
use of plastic.103 Thus, to find originality here, the court would have
needed to say that physical skill sufficed even in the absence of nontrivial variations. This the court would not do: “If there be a point in
the copyright law pertaining to reproductions at which sheer artistic
skill and effort can act as a substitute for the requirement of substantial variation, it was not reached here.”104
The Batlin court’s rationale can be seen as an early articulation
of the evidence theory:
Absent a genuine difference between the underlying work of art
and the copy of it for which protection is sought, the public interest
in promoting progress in the arts—indeed, the constitutional demand—could hardly be served. To extend copyrightability to minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment in the
hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and monopo105
lizing public domain work.

The last line of the court’s analysis is a tentative version of the evidence theory. It seems to say that evidentiary issues would be too
complex if courts were to allow copyright in minuscule variations.
Courts would find it difficult to distinguish permissible copying of the
underlying work from impermissible copying of the nearly identical
copyrighted work. That would indeed put “in the hands of mischie-

102. 536 F.2d at 490 (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103
(2d Cir. 1951)).
103. Id. at 489.
104. Id. at 491.
105. Id. at 492 (citation omitted).
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vous copiers” a dangerous power: the power to interfere with permis106
sible copying of the unprotected underlying work.
The most famous and complete articulation of the evidence theory came a few years after Batlin, specifically in the form of Judge
107
Posner’s opinion in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange. Like Batlin, Gracen concerned the copyright eligibility of a derivative work—that is, a
work based on a preexisting original. This time, the preexisting work
was a copyrighted movie, and the derivative work under consideration was a collector’s plate featuring a likeness of the film’s lead actress.108 The question presented was whether the artist who painted
the plate could acquire rights in the likeness and ultimately wield
those rights against a second artist also hired to make a line of collector’s plates. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner worried
about evidence:
[A]s applied to derivative works, the concept of originality in copyright law has as one would expect a legal rather than aesthetic function—to prevent overlapping claims. Suppose Artist A produces a
reproduction of the Mona Lisa, a painting in the public domain,
which differs slightly from the original. B also makes a reproduction
of the Mona Lisa. A, who has copyrighted his derivative work, sues
B for infringement. B’s defense is that he was copying the original,
not A’s reproduction. But if the difference between the original and
A’s reproduction is slight, the difference between A’s and B’s reproductions will also be slight, so that if B had access to A’s reproductions the trier of fact will be hard-pressed to decide whether B
was [impermissibly] copying A or [permissibly] copying the Mona
109
Lisa itself.

Interestingly, in Gracen, Judge Posner explicitly limited his articulation of the evidence theory to apply only to those cases where
the work at issue is based on another copyrighted work: “We are
speaking . . . only of the requirement of originality in derivative
106. The Second Circuit also discussed the evidence theory in Durham Industries, Inc. v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). There, the court again made reference to the “practical” difficulties associated with distinguishing between permissible copying from one source and
impermissible copying from a virtually identical source. Id. at 910–11.
107. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
108. Id. at 301.
109. Id. at 304 (citation omitted). Note that Gracen could have been resolved by better contracting, because the film production company enjoyed rights superior to those held by each individual plate artist. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (providing that the author of a derivative
work does not enjoy protection for “any part of the work in which [copyrighted] material has
been used unlawfully”).
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110
works.” As Judge Posner himself would later realize, however, the
same basic point applies much more broadly. Consider, for example,
111
Judge Posner’s opinion in Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc. One
part of that litigation concerned two beanbag animals, both described
by their firms as pigs.112 Judge Posner points out that, if either beanbag pig had at all resembled a real pig, the copyright issue would have
113
been a difficult one. The court in that instance would have had a
hard time determining whether one pig was copied from the other
(impermissible), or whether instead any similarity simply resulted
from the fact that both firms were trying to create a pig in beanbag
form. Fortunately, in Ty, neither beanbag pig looked remotely like a
real pig, and, thus, the evidence issue turned out to be straightforward.114
Gracen has been subject to a great deal of criticism in the years
since the opinion first issued. Professors Melvin and David Nimmer,
for example, have questioned how often these sorts of evidentiary
115
puzzles are likely to occur in practice. Was Gracen a fluke for presenting a case where two derivative works were so similar that it was
unclear whether the relevant authors copied from one another, or, instead, both borrowed from the same original work? The Nimmers
think so. In their words, it is “factually unjustified” to assume that
“any slight . . . variation that a given derivative work makes to a particular underlying work is likely to be similar to any slight variation to
the same underlying work made by a different derivative work
author.”116 Whether this criticism sticks is, in the end, an empirical
question. But the Nimmer argument focuses on the special case of derivative work, and one thus wonders whether they have accounted for
uncreative work more generally. After all, while fact patterns like that
from Gracen might sound far-fetched, it seems very reasonable to ex-

110. 698 F.2d at 305.
111. 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).
112. Id. at 1169.
113. Id. at 1170.
114. Whimsically, and just to amplify this point, Judge Posner included in the published
opinion a picture of two real pigs, along with pictures of the two beanbag pigs. Id. at 1174–75.
His message: this really was an easy case, as neither beanbag pig at all resembled the real pigs.
For another opinion written by Judge Posner that raised similar evidentiary issues, see Pickett v.
Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Whether Prince’s guitar is a copy of his copyrighted
symbol or a copy of Pickett’s guitar is likewise not a question that the methods of litigation can
readily answer with confidence.”).
115. 1 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.03[A] (2002).
116. Id.
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pect that different authors will routinely produce nearly identical
street maps, recipes, telephone books, and databases.
Professor Peter Jaszi is another prominent critic of Gracen, although his objections seem more like refinements than significant
challenges to the theory. One of his concerns is purely semantic. In
Gracen, Judge Posner held that a derivative work must be “substantially different from the underlying work” to avoid the evidence
117
quagmire. Professor Jaszi worries that this language, taken out of
context, might lead courts to demand too much from derivative
work,118 and thus he prefers earlier court language requiring only that
119
a derivative work be “distinguishable” from its predecessor. This is
a fair point as far as it goes, but it certainly does not refute Judge
Posner’s basic argument.
Another of Professor Jaszi’s objections is that the use of expert
120
testimony can solve any evidence problem. This seems to miss the
mark on several dimensions. First, it might not be true that experts
can readily determine the lineage of a given work or, more important,
that a finder of fact can evaluate dueling expert claims reliably. Second, even if experts are helpful, that point is not inconsistent with the
evidence theory. The theory, after all, is that certain categories of
copyright cases are so expensive to litigate that society might be better off excluding them from copyright’s purview. Professor Jaszi helpfully identifies one culprit for those high costs—experts—and he is
right about that. In certain cases, litigants will find it in their private
interest to incur significant litigation expenses, including the hiring of
experts, even though those expenses are socially unjustified. The
creativity requirement works to exclude some of these pricey cases
from the system.121
Professor John Wiley is the third copyright authority to criticize
Gracen. His concern is with cases where an author’s purpose is to cre-

117.
118.

698 F.2d at 305.
Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991
DUKE L.J. 455, 461 n.18 (describing Judge Posner’s standard as a “quantum leap” from earlier
decisions).
119. Id. at 461 n.19.
120. Id. at 462 n.20.
121. Interestingly, Professor Jaszi does ultimately find a rationale for the result in Gracen by
arguing that Judge Posner’s real motivation was an “implicit recognition of a hierarchy of artistic productions.” Id. at 462. As Professor Jaszi interprets the case, “it is easier to recognize and
reward as an ‘author’ one who paints on canvas with inspiration from nature than one who
paints on china with inspiration from old movie stills.” Id. at 463.
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ate a work that accurately mimics an existing work. On the evidence
theory, such a work might be denied protection; to Professor Wiley,
this sounds absurd. As interpreted in Gracen, “the copyright requirement of originality makes no sense because it claims variation as
a virtue, while authors of many objects of copyright protection rightly
122
regard variation as a vice.” In Gracen, for example, the artist’s purpose in creating the plates was to create an image recognizable to
anyone who saw the movie on which the plates were based. “Yet . . .
faithful accuracy doomed Gracen’s copyright suit,” Professor Wiley
complains, “for Judge Posner thought her painting looked hardly different from the movie.”123
Professor Wiley is correct: evidentiary concerns might lead
courts to deny protection to some works that are intentionally designed to be faithful reproductions. But that is not an unforeseen consequence. Instead, Professor Wiley points to one type of case where
copyright might rationally deny protection. The justification is not
that faithful reproductions are less valuable to society than other,
more distinctive works; nor is it that faithful reproductions are easier
to accomplish or in any other way less meritorious. The justification is
simply that these cases can be quite costly to litigate, and so a sensible
copyright regime might choose to exclude them on the theory that the
social costs seem likely to outweigh the social benefits.124
D. Implications
As applied to most uncreative work, the evidence theory alone is
sufficient to justify denying protection. For example, while reasonable
minds might disagree over whether food recipes should be denied

122. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 137
(1991).
123. Id. at 136–37. Judge Posner himself was not blind to this objection; in an article published a few years after Gracen, Posner expresses concern over cases where “the creativity of the
derivative work consists precisely in the fidelity with which it reproduces the impression created
by the original.” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 357 (1989).
124. Elsewhere in his analysis, Professor Wiley argues that evidentiary problems should not
lead to exclusion, but should, instead, be resolved by a higher standard of proof. “If difficult
questions of proof indeed arise in future cases, the appropriate solution is a high standard of
proof for plaintiffs—not a definition of originality that punishes them for successfully achieving
a goal that is socially deserving and efficient.” Wiley, supra note 122, at 137. I agree that this is
another viable approach. It would discourage litigation in instances of evidentiary complexity,
but it would still leave copyright as a possibility in appropriate cases. The modern registration
requirement works exactly this way. See infra Part III.C.
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protection because of their arguably low social value or, quite the opposite, because of the public’s strong interest in free access to this information, the evidence theory moots the debate. No matter what the
right answer to the social value and public access questions, recipes
should be excluded because copyright protection in this instance
would present an extraordinary problem with respect to proof. The
social costs of resolving those evidentiary difficulties would likely
outweigh any social benefits that might accrue from protecting recipes
in the first place.
Ironically, the main implications of the evidence theory therefore
come in cases where the evidence theory is not compelling, and, because of that, the only way to justify the search for creativity is to lean
on one of the traditional but more troubling explanations. Feist is one
such case. There was no evidence problem in Feist because Rural had
planted in its original directory a handful of fictitious listings—entries
that were included for the very purpose of detecting unauthorized
125
copying. Had Feist compiled its own telephone listings, or had it
even simply confirmed the listings provided by Rural, it would have
detected the false entries and eliminated them. Feist did neither. Four
fake listings thus survived in Feist’s directory, testifying to the fact of
copying and also suggesting its approximate extent.126
This does not mean that Rural should have won its copyright
case. But it does mean that the only way to justify the Court’s reliance
on creativity is to tell a compelling story about social value, production costs, or the public’s interest in free access to telephone information. That, frankly, is hard to do. The telephone directory at issue was
obviously expensive to create and valuable once created, so those rationales do not work. That leaves only one plausible rationale, namely
that copyright was in this case rightly denied because of the public’s
strong interest in free telephone information. But even that is open to
debate. Local telephone companies must earn revenues sufficient to
cover the substantial fixed costs of the telephone plant. It might be in

125. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
126. The false entries in Feist did no harm because no consumer was ever going to look up a
nonexistent neighbor. The same might not be true for false entries on a map or in a research
database. Thus, the use of fictional information is only plausible for certain types of work.
Note, too, that in Feist, an independent copyright claim could have been raised with respect to the false listings. They were creative, after all, and one could thus argue that at least
those entries should have been protected by copyright. Rural likely did not advance this argument because (1) the copying probably would have been deemed de minimis, and (2) Rural
would have had a hard time showing that any damages flowed from this copying.
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the public interest to recognize copyright in telephone directories
and, in that way, allow telephone companies to earn some of the necessary revenue through the sale of Yellow Page advertisements. After
all, the alternative is to deny copyright and thereby force regulators to
127
approve higher telephone rates.
Whatever one thinks of this argument, it certainly makes clear
that creativity itself says nothing about the right answer in this case. It
is possible that Rural should have won, and it is possible that Rural
should have lost. But it borders on the absurd to decide the case by
asking whether telephone listings are creative.
One might be tempted to dismiss all this as much ado about
nothing. No legal regime works perfectly, and, thus, the fact that the
Court decided one case on seemingly irrelevant grounds is only so
important. But it turns out that there is a large category of work for
which this same problem recurs: works, like telephone directories,
that are for the most part collections of facts. For these works, the
creativity requirement is today a significant obstacle to protection.
Yet there is typically no evidence problem. And, while sometimes
valid in particular cases, concerns about public access, social value,
and production costs do not justify a blanket rule barring protection.
Think about evidence first. Evidentiary issues are typically quite
manageable in these cases because fact-intensive research generates a
rich paper trail. Suppose, for example, that two biographers each decide to write the life story of boxer Lennox Lewis. True, the resulting
works would both likely tell a similar tale of a young man who grew
up in London and went on to win Olympic Gold in Seoul. But a court
would have no trouble determining whether the biographers copied
from one another as opposed to working independently. After all, the
very act of researching Lewis’s life should generate evidence in the
form of airline tickets, taped interviews, and the like, evidence that
127. Judge Greene adopted this position in United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), the decision that accepted, with modifications, the
consent decree that settled the government’s antitrust case against the Bell Telephone Company, id. at 225–26. One issue at play was the question of whether postdivestiture local telephone carriers should be allowed to continue producing Yellow Page directories. Judge Greene
thought they should, his explanation being that “the Yellow Pages provide a significant subsidy
to local telephone rates,” and that the “loss of this large subsidy” would lead to higher rates, a
result “clearly contrary to the goal of providing affordable telephone service for all Americans.”
Id. at 193–94. For a fuller discussion of how best to recover the fixed costs of the telephone network, see STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 621–
23 (2001) (discussing Ramsey pricing); KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION 117–40
(1991) (same).
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would clearly and easily distinguish cases of innocent similarity from
those of impermissible copying.
If evidence does not justify exclusion, do any of the other theories explain why all factual works should be denied protection? Surely
not the social value and production cost rationales, because factual
works are often of great value and are often expensive to create. As
for the public’s strong interest in having access to factual information,
128
I have already argued that this interest cuts both ways. If the goal is
to increase the public’s access to factual information, it is not clear
whether the best approach is to offer copyright, and thereby increase
the incentive to gather and disseminate this material, or deny copyright, and thereby maximize public access to information that is or
will be made available. At best, then, this rationale justifies denying
protection in some fraction of the cases, but surely not all of them.
Are there other concerns, then, that justify a ban on protection?
Courts have in the past worried that, by recognizing copyright in
facts, copyright law would create patent-like monopolies in factual in129
formation. But that is not true. Copyright stops only unauthorized
borrowing. So, even if one party were to hold copyright in some particular fact it discovered, another party could always return to primary sources and re-gather that same information. Recognizing copyright in a biography of Lennox Lewis would therefore not mean that
there would be only one book about his life; it would simply mean
that later authors would either have to confirm the various factual
claims themselves or (more likely) cut a deal with the first author.
The exact scope of permissible borrowing would need to be worked
out—it would be hard, for example, to negate all the benefits that a
second researcher inevitably enjoys—but no matter how the nuances
are resolved, it is clear that one can recognize copyright in these instances without creating monopolies in factual material.
Courts have also worried that, in certain settings, a second-comer
might not be able to reconfirm a first author’s factual claims. That is
admittedly an important special case, and it might be that the fair use
128. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1983)
(worrying that copyright might inadvertently allow an individual to be “the owner of an important political event merely by being the first to depict that event in words”), rev’d on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Moore Publ’g, Inc. v. Big Sky Mktg., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1371, 1379
(D. Idaho 1990) (“By placing ideas and facts beyond copyright protection, while allowing protection for the expression of those ideas or the arrangement of those facts, the Copyright Act
prevents monopolization of facts or ideas . . . . ”).
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doctrine should be available to excuse unauthorized borrowing in
130
such circumstances. It would be impossible, for example, for a second videographer to capture footage of President John F. Kennedy’s
assassination, and, certainly, that fact is relevant when considering the
appropriate scope of protection for the original video images.131 Similarly, some factual research might be so expensive that it exhibits
132
natural monopoly properties. The costs of sending an unmanned
vehicle to explore the Titanic wreckage are exorbitant even given
modern technology; so, while it is technically feasible for a second exploration, the economics might mean that the Titanic example should
be thought of as parallel to the President Kennedy example. But,
again, these are special cases that would likely justify special exceptions. In most situations, facts can be independently gathered by multiple parties, and, thus, copyright would not yield monopoly.
Another concern that must be accounted for is the worry that
protection of factual information will lead to wasteful duplication of
133
research. The possibility of Coasian bargaining calls that claim into
question; the fact that the second-comer can re-gather the information should set up a dynamic where the first party licenses to the second and thereby avoids any wasteful duplication. But many respected
commentators worry that transaction costs, strategic behavior, and
other forms of market breakdown will block the bargain; and, in cases
where that seems plausible, again, intellectual property rules could be
tailored accordingly.134

130. The fair use doctrine excuses infringement in instances where leniency seems appropriate on policy grounds. The doctrine was codified in 1976, but it nevertheless remains a freewheeling policy inquiry, allowing flexible responses to exceptional situations like those identified in the text. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (offering a nonexclusive list of factors to consider).
131. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (rejecting
the argument that the Kennedy footage “could not be the subject of copyright because . . . to
allow copyright would result in the appropriation of the subject matter,” but nevertheless finding unauthorized copying to be fair use).
132. A market exhibits the properties of a natural monopoly in instances where a single firm
can satisfy market demand at a lower total cost than can two or more firms. Among the policy
implications are: (1) competition in such a market is wasteful, because total costs are greater
than they could be in its absence; and (2) there is some danger that only one firm can survive
economically, and, thus, natural monopoly markets might in the long term tend to become monopolized. For a general discussion, see BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 127, at 374–80.
133. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir.
1966) (“It is just such wasted effort that the proscription against the copyright of ideas and
facts . . . [is] designed to prevent.”).
134. Professor Jane Ginsburg, for example, questions the viability of market forces in this
setting and advocates the use of compulsory licenses. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1916–37.
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My claim with respect to factual works, then, is not that all factual work should be protected, or even that factual work, when protected, should be accorded exactly the same scope of protection that
is accorded creative work. Instead, my claim is only that a lack of
creativity is not itself a good reason to deny these works protection.
False facts and rich paper trails both operate in this context to minimize any evidentiary concerns, and none of the other rationales justify a general prohibition. Moreover, there are strong arguments to be
made in favor of at least some narrow form of protection. After all,
the same freerider problem that (from an economic perspective) justifies copyright protection for creative work seems to justify protection
for factual work as well.
The details here of course require more thought. For instance,
maybe protection should extend only to certain classes of facts, or
maybe it should apply only to facts that are captured in database
135
form. Federal copyright law today cannot adequately explore these
details because the Constitution has been interpreted to require that
copyright analysis stop at the question of whether a work is creative.
This yields a blanket rule denying protection to factual works, and
precludes the more careful analysis that the topic deserves.
Worse, this is not just a problem for copyright law, but, in fact,
threatens to be a problem for federal law more generally. Consider,
for example, Congress’s recent attempts to use its authority under the
Commerce Clause to protect databases from certain types of unau136
thorized duplication. Many scholars think that copyright law’s creativity requirement renders this legislation unconstitutional. Their
logic: under Feist, the Constitution authorizes Congress to award
copyright protection only to works that demonstrate some modicum
of creativity; the proposed legislation must, therefore, be unconstitutional, because it allows Congress to skirt the constitutional limitation
imposed by the Copyright Clause simply by invoking the Commerce

135. For some interesting lessons from the European experience with database protection,
see Stephen M. Maurer et al., Europe’s Database Experiment, 294 SCIENCE 789, 790 (2001) (arguing that Europe’s experiment “has eroded the public domain, overprotected ‘synthetic value’
of doubtful worth [e.g., telephone number listings], and has raised new barriers to data aggregation”).
136. E.g., Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998); Database Investment and
Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).
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137
Clause. If this argument holds, then Feist in effect bars all forms of
federal protection for uncreative work, and it does so without any
policy rationale capable of supporting that result.

II. FIXATION
There are two main prerequisites to federal copyright protection.
The first, which Part I considers, is the requirement that an eligible
work be original to the author in question. The second, and the subject of this Part, is the requirement that an eligible work be “fixed in
138
any tangible medium of expression.”
The key statutory provision is section 102(a) of the Copyright
Act. That provision states, in relevant part, that federal copyright protection begins when original expression is captured in a physical form
from which it can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”139 To take some simple examples, a playwright satisfies this
requirement by preparing a typewritten manuscript or by filming a
performance of his play on videotape, and a composer satisfies the
requirement by creating sheet music or recording an album. Fixation
is a broad concept. The statute defines acceptable fixations to include
“any tangible medium . . . now known or later developed, from which
[expression] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”140
The most striking aspect of the fixation requirement is that an
acceptable tangible embodiment does not need to survive for any significant period of time. Fixation is like a trigger. Copyright protection
commences the moment there exists a physical embodiment “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit [the associated expression] to
137. For discussion, see Paul J. Heald, The Extraction/Duplication Dichotomy: Constitutional Line-Drawing in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 935–41 (2001) (examining
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of implied limitations on Congressional power and
applying it to the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT
§ 2.2.1, at 2:10 (2d. ed. 1998) (interpreting Feist to implicitly authorize this use of the Commerce
Clause).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
139. Id.
140. Id. This was not always true. For example, right before Congress clarified the issue in
the 1909 Act, the Supreme Court interpreted the preexisting copyright statute such that piano
rolls did not constitute a physical “copy” of their associated musical works. White-Smith Music
Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). The Court did so because piano rolls were not
directly accessible to humans, but were, instead, parts of a machine that produced musical tones
only after being connected to the rest of the mechanism. Id. at 18. Today, by contrast, piano
rolls would surely constitute adequate fixations.
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be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
141
more than transitory duration.” Thus, expression captured in a
computer’s memory can be sufficiently fixed even though the expres142
sion would be immediately lost were the computer to lose power;
and an author can intentionally destroy the fixation on which his
copyright is based without in any way endangering his statutory
143
rights. In short, fixation does not imply permanence. Once a physical embodiment exists, copyright begins, and nothing more turns on
the continued existence of that physical embodiment.
Fixation is easily accomplished for most works. Books, paintings,
and motion pictures are all natural ways for an author to communicate expression to others, and—even if quickly lost or destroyed—
these embodiments all adequately fix expression for the purposes of
federal copyright eligibility. Sheet music and sound recordings are
similarly natural ways to communicate musical compositions, and
these, too, typically suffice. The fixation requirement turns out to be a
significant hurdle only with respect to a narrow category of works, pri144
marily those that are performed but not recorded. Certain types of
145
choreography might fall into this category, as might impromptu per146
formances like standup comedy and interactive theater. Also excluded from copyright on this ground are purely oral communications
like folk tales and unrecorded radio broadcasts,147 and certain evanescent art forms such as sand castles, ice carvings, and, arguably,

141. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “fixed”).
142. See, e.g., Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D.
Va. 1994) (considering whether copies of computer software stored in RAM are “fixed” for
copyright purposes).
143. See, e.g., Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1498–99 (11th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
copyright even though the author knowingly destroyed his own copy of the work).
144. Note that unfixed work can still be protected under state law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1)
(explicitly declining to preempt state law as applied to unfixed works).
145. For discussion particular to choreography, see Leslie Erin Wallis, Comment, The Different Art: Choreography and Copyright, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1442, 1456 (1986) (noting that choreography will often fail to meet the fixation requirement).
146. On interactive theater, see Gregory Donat, Note, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with
Teeth for Improvisational Performers, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1367 (1997) (arguing that “the
fixation requirement of federal copyright law should be relaxed to bring improvisational artists
within the fold of federal copyright protection”).
147. See, e.g., Fritz v. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 95, 101–02 (D. Mass. 1996) (excluding oral lectures from copyright protection); Falwell v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp.
1204, 1207 (W.D. Va. 1981) (noting that “[t]he existence of common law copyright protection
for the spoken word has not been established by any court,” and declining to “set an unprecedented departure from the state of the law as it presently exists”).
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graphical displays that appear on but then disappear from computer
148
screens.
This Part argues that the main justification for the fixation requirement is that unfixed work would present considerable challenges
with respect to proof. The analysis proceeds in three Sections. Section
A considers the history of the fixation requirement in federal law.
The purpose of this historical survey is to better understand how fixation currently works, and what purposes lawmakers might have
thought it would serve. Section B considers a variety of possible rationales for the fixation requirement, for example the argument that
fixation serves to create an archive of society’s cultural accomplishments. Finally, Section C articulates the evidence rationale and uses it
to criticize the modern fixation requirement.
A. Foundations
The phrase “fixed in any tangible medium of expression” was
first introduced into copyright law by the 1976 Act, but the basic idea
of requiring a tangible embodiment was part of federal copyright law
right from the start. The Constitution authorizes Congress to protect
“writings,”149 and almost any definition of that term would seem to
require a physical rendering. This would certainly have been true had
the word been interpreted literally, and, thus, taken to include only
objects like books, letters, and other paper documents from which
words are directly accessible to readers. Even as courts and Congress
adopted more generous interpretations, however, the common thread
was always (and quite naturally) an assumption that “writings” had to
be in physical form.
Thus, in the same opinion where it reminded lower courts that
the term “writings” is not to be construed in its “narrow literal sense
but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional principles,” the Supreme Court limited the term to mean
150
only “physical rendering[s]” of expression. Similarly, in a different
148. This has been and continues to be a contentious issue, for example in cases involving
the visual output of computer video games. See, e.g., Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys.
Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (considering whether copies of computer software
that “disappear[] from RAM the instant the computer is turned off” are fixed); Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distribution, 659 F. Supp. 449, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (holding
that a “status screen” is a “compilation . . . copyrightable to the extent of its arrangement and
design of parameter/command terms”).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
150. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
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case, Judge Learned Hand wrote a dissent to argue that the relevant
majority had taken too narrow a view of copyright’s permissible subject matter, but, even there, Judge Hand drew the line at physical
manifestation. Any work can be a constitutional writing, argued
Judge Hand, provided that the expression can be “embodied in a
151
physical form capable of being copied.” Congress has never pushed
this boundary. While federal law has over time significantly expanded
the categories of what is deemed eligible for copyright—the earliest
statute focused on maps, books, and charts, while the modern statute
includes motion pictures, sculpture, and the like—no federal copyright statute has ever attempted to protect completely intangible expression.152 In the courts and implicitly in Congress, then, the Constitution itself has been interpreted to establish a basic fixation
requirement, and that interpretation took hold long before the 1976
Act formally introduced the fixation requirement into federal law.
The Copyright Act of 1909 also foreshadowed what would be153
come the modern Act’s fixation requirement. Under the 1909 Act,
the primary means by which an author could trigger copyright protection was by “publication” of an original expressive work.154 In particular, an author could secure copyright through publication so long
as each published copy contained a notice of copyright that complied
with various statutory formalities.155 Publication was a critical moment
under the 1909 Act both for acquiring and for forfeiting copyright
rights: publication with adequate copyright notice would immediately
bring a work into the federal regime, but publication without adequate notice would immediately inject the work into the public do151. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955)
(Hand, J., dissenting in part) (favoring the copyright eligibility of sound recordings).
152. There is one possible exception, namely, a statute passed in 1994 that prohibits the unauthorized recording of live musical performances. See Unauthorized Fixation and Trafficking
in Sound Recordings and Music Videos, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4974 (1994) (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2002)). I exclude it from consideration in the text because it is generally not
considered to be a copyright statute. Nevertheless, the statute is interesting in that, on the one
hand, it creates rights in an intangible (a live performance), yet, on the other hand, those rights
are only relevant in instances where someone has fixed the work, and, at that, fixed it during the
actual performance in question. The statute thus has a fixation requirement of sorts, the only
difference being that fixation under this statute is not accomplished by the relevant author or his
agent, but is accomplished by some would-be pirate. For further discussion of this antibootleg
provision, see LEAFFER, supra note 90, at 50–52.
153. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), repealed by Copyright
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
154. Id. § 9, at 1077.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (repealed 1976).
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156
main. How does this tie into the fixation requirement? Under the
relevant case law, “publication” could occur only after the relevant
expression was put in tangible form. As one influential commentator
summarized the cases, a work was published only when “the original
or tangible copies . . . [were] sold, leased, loaned, given away, or otherwise made available to the general public.”157 Thus, oral remarks,158
public performances,159 and even radio broadcasts160 were not publications for copyright purposes, whereas mass distributions of books or
161
pamphlets obviously were.

156. Detailed case law arose to define with precision the concept of publication. In fact,
courts developed two parallel definitions: a relatively permissive definition that was typically
applied in cases where an author wanted to show that he had published his work and thereby
triggered protection (“investive” publication), and a narrow definition that was applied in cases
where the author wanted to show that he had not published and hence it did not matter that he
had failed to give adequate copyright notice (“divestive” publication). See Hirshon v. United
Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (“[I]t takes more in the way of publication to
invalidate any copyright . . . than to validate it.” (emphasis omitted)). For a helpful overview of
investive and divestive publication, see ROBERT GORMAN & JANE GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 384–87 (5th ed. 1999).
157. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 115, § 4.04. The term “publication” was not explicitly
defined in the 1909 Act. In the 1976 Act, a definition was included, and the House Report for
the 1976 Act states that this new definition was added to make “plain that any form or dissemination in which a material object does not change hands—performances or displays on television, for example—is not a publication no matter how many people are exposed to the work.”
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 138 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5754.
158. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 5(c), 12 (both repealed 1976) (establishing by negative implication that
oral delivery alone cannot constitute publication); Nutt v. Nat’l Inst. for the Improvement of
Memory, Inc., 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1929) (“A public performance of a dramatic or musical
composition is not an abandonment of the composition to the public.”); King v. Mister Maestro,
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (“The ‘oral delivery’ of his speech . . . no matter how
vast his audience, did not amount to a general publication of his literary work.”). But see Estate
of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding
that the King speech represents an exception to this general principle due to the scope of the
public oration).
159. See, e.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 437 (1912) (holding that public presentation
of a dramatic composition which had not been printed or published did not end a common law
copyright); Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a prerelease screening of a motion picture “was not a publication divesting the work of its common
law copyright”); Burke v. NBC, 598 F.2d 688, 693 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that making a copy of
a film available for use in lectures and on an educational television program does not constitute
publication).
160. See Michael B. Landau, “Publication,” Musical Compositions, and the Copyright Act of
1909: Still Crazy After all these Years, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 29, 33 (2000) (explaining why
radio broadcasts were not treated as publications, and criticizing the result).
161. See, e.g., J.A. Richards, Inc., v. N.Y. Post, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)
(holding that no copyright existed because the pamphlet at issue was published without adequate notice).
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The 1909 Act implicitly required fixation in another way as well.
Section 13 of the 1909 Act stated that, after an author triggered federal protection through publication with notice, the author had to deposit with the Copyright Office “two complete copies” of the pub162
lished work. Exceptions to this deposit obligation were recognized
for cases where it was “impracticable to deposit copies because of
their size, weight, fragility, or monetary value,” but, even in these instances, a photograph or other identifying physical reproduction was
163
required. Deposit was thus in practical effect another fixation requirement. The requirement was not particularly strict—the statute
stated that copies should be deposited “promptly,”164 but the Supreme
Court held that deposit could be made any time prior to the filing of
165
an infringement action —yet it was a statutory obligation that unfixed expression could not satisfy, and it thus further reinforced the
notion that intangible works were ineligible for protection under the
1909 Act.
The discussion thus far focuses on published work, but statutory
provisions applicable to unpublished work further established an implicit fixation requirement. Other than publication with notice, the
only way to claim federal copyright under the 1909 Act was to register
166
an unpublished work with the government. Not all categories of unpublished expression were eligible for protection by registration; the
167
statute included a specific list of eligible categories. Even for eligible
works, however, fixation was a precondition to registration. Again,
this was not an explicit requirement set forth in the statute; but the
only way to register an unpublished work was to submit to the Copyright Office a copy of the work in tangible form.168 Thus, fixation was
in practice mandatory. Interestingly, unpublished works did not have
to be completely fixed in order to be registered under the 1909 Act.
An unpublished motion picture, for example, could be registered by
the submission of just “one print taken from each scene or act.”169
Building on this base, the 1976 Act introduced fixation as a separate prerequisite to federal protection. The House Report for the
162. 17 U.S.C. § 13 (repealed 1976).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 42 (1939).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (repealed 1976).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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1976 Act suggests that the new provision “perpetuates the existing
requirement that a work be fixed in a tangible medium of expres170
sion,” and, although the Report does not draw these analogies, the
modern fixation requirement does indeed seem to be modeled after
the 1909 Act’s publication, registration, and deposit provisions. For
example, the fact that fixations are not required to survive much beyond their first moments of existence suggests that lawmakers were
thinking about publication when crafting the fixation requirement.
Publication under the 1909 Act was a discrete act that took place at
the start of the copyright term. By interpreting fixation as they did,
lawmakers gave fixation a similar feel: fixation marks the start of the
copyright term, but it is not an obligation that lasts much beyond that
triggering event.
At the same time, the new fixation requirement did represent a
significant change from the fixation requirement previously implicit in
the publication, deposit, and registration provisions. Under those
provisions, fixation alone was never enough. To qualify for protection
through publication, for example, an author had to not only capture
his expression in tangible form, but also engage in an appropriate
form of public dissemination with notice. Registration similarly conditioned protection on fixation plus an additional act, in this case, deposit of that fixation with the government. The 1976 copyright revision eliminated these additional requirements, recognizing copyright
on the basis of fixation alone. That greatly expanded the number of
works eligible for federal protection, and it was therefore a significant
re-envisioning of fixation’s role in the copyright regime.171

170. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
171. Even under the 1976 Act, publication, registration, and deposit continued to be important concepts. Publication remained relevant because, until the law changed again in 1989, an
author could still forfeit federal rights if he published his protected work without adequate notice. See Copyright Act of 1976, § 401(a), Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2576 (1976) (establishing general notice requirements). That risk was eliminated by the Berne Convention Implementation Act, sec. 7, § 405, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857–58 (1988) (amending the
act to eliminate the strict notice requirement). Today, publication remains relevant in a variety
of contexts, such as in establishing the term of copyright for anonymous and pseudonymous
works. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000) (establishing for these works a copyright “term of 95 years
from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first,” but allowing the regular provisions to take effect if the author’s identity is
revealed). Registration, too, continues to play a role in the federal system. For example, authors
who register their work enjoy certain evidentiary presumptions as to the validity of their copyrights, and also have the option to pursue additional remedies specially available to registered
works. See infra Part III.C. Deposit survived as a requirement after 1976 as well, playing basi-
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B. Rationales
One virtue of fixation is that it increases the likelihood that the
relevant expression will be passed from place to place, person to person, and generation to generation. Unrecorded expression—say, a
folk tale—is difficult to transfer over time and space. Fixed expression, by contrast, is durable and transferable. One possible rationale
for the fixation requirement, then, might be that it increases the nation’s cultural stockpile, enriching society by making expression more
accessible and long-lasting.172
Such an explanation would be consistent with copyright’s deposit
requirement. As was explained in the previous Section, copyright
holders have long been required to deposit copies of their published
works with the Copyright Office. Those copies are then passed to the
Library of Congress, and, from there, the public can access them. The
House Report on a copyright revision act from 1989 explicitly justifies
deposit on cultural grounds, explaining that deposit creates “a strong
and dynamic national library . . . that acquires, preserves and makes
accessible . . . the material expressions of our national cultural life.”173
Of course, if cultural preservation really were the goal, both deposit and fixation could do more. Deposit, for example, is today en174
forced only by a system of modest fines. The requirement would
have significantly more bite if failure to deposit would result in, say,
the complete loss of copyright protection. Similarly, fixations are
deemed acceptable even if they last only a short period of time. Fixation would be more effective at preserving expression if tangible embodiments were required to survive for a longer period. All this can
be explained, however. Modern copyright law in many ways has attempted to ease the burdens associated with qualifying for and maintaining copyright.175 Thus, the leniency built into the modern fixation
cally the same role post-1976 as it did prior to that time. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2000) (maintaining
the requirement of depositing “two compete copies of the best edition” or “complete phonorecords of the best edition” within three months of publication).
172. For a fuller articulation of this argument, see Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 773–79 (2001).
173. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., BERNE CONVENTION
IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 44–45 (1988).
174. 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (assessing a fine of $250 for failure to deposit within three months
and a fine of $2500 “if such person willfully or repeatedly fails or refuses to comply with such a
demand” to deposit).
175. See, e.g., Berne Convention Implementation Act, sec. 7, § 405, 102 Stat. at 2857–58
(eliminating notice as a prerequisite to protection).
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and deposit requirements might just be the result of a balance between the desire to have a long-lasting written archive and the desire
to avoid any rules that might make it too difficult to qualify for or
maintain federal rights.
One might similarly ask why the law would use both fixation and
deposit to further the goal of cultural preservation when deposit, it
seems, could accomplish this goal by itself. The answer most likely is
that the Copyright Office cannot reasonably handle the full burden.
Even today, a time when only published works are subject to the deposit requirement, many works are removed from the collection after
176
five years due to limited storage space. This practical difficulty
would grow exponentially worse were deposit extended to include all
the many unpublished works that today are fixed but not deposited.
Thus, fixation can be defended from this criticism by noting that fixation is a valuable supplement to deposit.
A more devastating criticism is that the archival rationale turns
on an errant assumption, namely, the assumption that the fixation requirement is effective at encouraging authors to fix expression. After
all, the archival rationale explains fixation only if, by requiring fixation, the law increases the number of works that are fixed and thereby
increases the cultural archive. But that seems unlikely. Even without
the fixation requirement, fixation is already cheap, easy, and significantly in an author’s own interest. A videotape is a sufficient fixation,
and even that inexpensive embodiment would significantly help an
author prove his case in the event of infringement litigation. Thus,
there is already a strong incentive to fix, and the extra pressure
brought on by the fixation requirement likely has little marginal impact.
A second and more promising rationale for the fixation requirement is that it helps to distinguish authors whose expressive activities
were motivated by copyright from authors for whom copyright was an
afterthought. Drawing this sort of distinction would be desirable because, while copyright is likely worth its costs in instances where it
encourages expressive production, copyright might not be worthwhile
in cases where the promise of protection did not in any way increase
177
the incentive to create. Given how easy it is to fix expression, it is

176. Policy Statement on Deposit Retention Schedule, 48 Fed. Reg. 12,862, 12,862–63 (Mar.
28, 1983).
177. Copyright protection is designed to encourage dissemination as well as creation. Thus,
there might be reason to recognize copyright even in instances where the relevant author was
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reasonable to assume that authors who fail to fix their works within a
certain period of time are not thinking about copyright protection
and, hence, should be excluded from the federal regime. Such exclusions would benefit society (because this expression would be free for
all to use) without diminishing expressive production (because, in
these instances, copyright was not a relevant incentive in the first
place).
This rationale in essence treats fixation as a signal, and that is
both a strength and a weakness. The strength is that, if fixation is just
a signal, then it is easy to see why fixations need only last a short period of time. Once an author fixes his work, the signal is given, and
there is little reason to demand that the resulting tangible object survive for a long time thereafter. The weakness: fixation seems too simple an act to serve as an effective signal, in that it generates too many
false positives. Consumers write down their shopping lists, after all,
yet, by that act, they are in no way meaning to imply that copyright
law motivates their expression. If copyright law really were trying to
establish a signal that would reveal author motivations, a better approach would be to choose a less conventional act as the relevant signal. The 1909 Act did this through its requirement that authors put a
copyright notice on all published works. Copyright notice was such an
unusual combination of markings—typically, the letter “c” inside a
circle, plus the author’s name and the date of first publication, all
178
placed at a location specified by the statute —that the resulting signal was cumbersome but unambiguous. Anyone who was motivated
179
by copyright law could (in theory) give the signal, but anyone not
thinking of copyright was unlikely to stumble into protection through
good fortune alone.180
not originally motivated by the allure of copyright protection. Similarly, copyright law is also
designed to discourage wasteful forms of self-help, for example, the creation of elaborate encryption schemes. Discouraging this waste might be another reason to recognize copyright, even
if copyright was not a motivating factor with respect to the work’s original creation.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 19 (repealed 1976).
179. For many years, lawmakers debated whether the notice requirement was too technical,
leading to “arbitrary and unjust forfeitures” of copyright in cases where an author was caught
unaware by the notice obligation, or erred in trying to satisfy it. HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 143 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5759.
180. The House Report on the 1976 Act lists as one of the “principal functions” of the notice requirement that it places “in the public domain a substantial body of published material
that no one is interested in copyrighting.” Id. Of course, the notice requirement served other
purposes as well. For example, it served to “inform[] the public as to whether a particular work
is copyrighted.” Id.
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Other possible rationales for fixation focus on various practical
ramifications that are loosely associated with fixation. For example,
fixation exposes a work to greater risk of infringement because, with
physical embodiments available, an author will have a hard time
monitoring access to and use of his work. This increased risk might
justify increased protection. Similarly, fixation increases an author’s
ability to profit from his work because fixed versions can be sold,
leased, and otherwise profitably transferred. That might explain why
federal law starts the copyright term at the moment of fixation. Such a
policy supports the author’s profit-seeking activities in the short term,
but ensures that, after a period of profit-making activity, copyright
will end and the work will be dedicated to the public. These types of
practical explanations were often used to justify the 1909 Act’s publication requirement,181 and, as I will explain now, they have some allure when it comes to explaining fixation as well.
Consider, first, the argument that the act of fixation puts a work
at increased risk of infringement and thus justifies increased legal protection. This logic would explain fixation but for the fact that fixation
182
is such a poor proxy for risk. Publication was a plausible proxy for
risk, because there actually is increased risk the moment a work
leaves the immediate control of its author and is instead made available to some fraction of the general public.183 But fixation? Expression
can be fixed but nonetheless remain in its author’s tight control, as it

Comparing the notice requirement to fixation reveals another important difference: notice had to be accomplished at or near the moment of publication, whereas fixation can occur
any time before the filing of an infringement action. The stricter timing obligation inherent in
the notice requirement makes it a better signal. Everyone, after all, is thinking about copyright
right before they file suit; the interesting question is whether a given author was thinking about
publication when he first created (or disseminated) his expressive work.
181. See, e.g., LEAFFER, supra note 90, at 147 (explaining “publication” as the moment when
an author begins to earn the economic fruits of his labor, and, in exchange, the moment when
the clock starts to run on protection).
182. The risk argument does make sense of the fact that fixations are required to last only
for periods of nontransitory duration. After all, once the genie is out of the bottle, the author
remains at risk even if the original fixation is destroyed.
183. As Professors Gorman and Ginsburg point out, however, the concept of publication
was “not always coterminous with the general notion of ‘making public,’” but was, instead, often
a “rather technical construct.” See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 156, at 384.
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does, for example, with a personal diary. Conversely, expression can
be unfixed and yet significantly at risk, as it is with expression made
available in playhouses or broadcast over the airwaves via radio and
television. Thus, if copyright law really were looking to identify a
moment of increased risk to an author, it would be odd to focus on
the moment of fixation instead of, say, publication or dissemination.184
As for the second argument—that fixation marks the start of significant financial returns, and, thus, should also mark the start of the
copyright term—this argument was much stronger as applied to publication than it is as applied to fixation. Under the 1909 Act, copyright
terms were measured from the moment of first publication. A work
first published in 1958, for example, was (under 1909 law) free for all
185
to use a maximum of fifty-six years later. Under modern law, by
contrast, copyright expires a given number of years after the relevant
author’s death, regardless of when any specific work was first fixed.186
Thus, if the quid pro quo is that the author begins to earn profits, but,
in exchange, must start to see his copyright term run, modern law
does not implement the bargain.187 No matter when each work was
188
fixed, copyright for all of an author’s works end at the same time.

184. At the time of the 1976 Act, the Register of Copyrights advocated the use of “dissemination” as the standard instead of “publication” or, presumably, “fixation.” REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, REGISTER’S REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW (1961), reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
app. at 14-4 (1992).
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 1976). Due to the 1976 revisions, a work first published in
1958 has actually ended up with a term of ninety-five years. See id. § 304(a)(1)(B) (2000):
Any copyright, the first term of which is subsisting on January 1, 1978, shall endure
for 28 years from the date it was originally secured [and in] the case of [specified
works] the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of
the copyright in such work for the further term of 67 years.
186. See id. § 302 (providing copyright protection for the life of the author and for seventy
years after the author’s death).
187. One caveat: the 1976 Act does preempt state law that might have otherwise recognized
perpetual rights. See id. § 301 (“[N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in
any work under the common law or statutes of any State.”). Thus, federal protection starts the
clock on an author’s rights in the limited sense that, prior to qualifying for federal protection, in
at least some states the author would have enjoyed perpetual protection, either under state statutes or under common law copyright. This seems like a trivial sacrifice, however, given how long
federal copyright terms today last.
188. This could be changed, of course, but such a change would open up a wide range of additional policy issues related to the relative benefits of fixed versus relative copyright terms. See
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 133–37 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5750 (explaining why duration
should be tied to the life of the author rather than the date of first publication).
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Some cynical observers might be tempted to explain fixation as a
ploy through which copyright increases the number of works in the
public domain. This was a common explanation for the notice provisions that were in effect until 1989. Under the 1909 Act, notice was
subject to so many complicated formalities that many authors who attempted to include adequate notice nevertheless failed, thereby forfeiting their federal rights. Those works fell into the public domain,
189
enriching the stockpile of expression that was free for all to use.
Obligations under an international copyright treaty ultimately forced
Congress to eliminate notice as an obstacle to protection,190 but one
could argue that fixation has perhaps taken over the role.
This cynical argument is ultimately untenable, however. First,
while works published without notice fell directly into the public domain under pre-1989 law, unfixed works do not today become part of
the public domain. Instead, unfixed works simply are not eligible for
federal protection. Section 301 of the modern Act makes this clear by
explicitly declining to preempt state law that might protect unfixed
191
work. Many such state protections exist. A California statute, for
example, protects “any original work of authorship that is not fixed in
192
any tangible medium of expression.” Thus, unlike work published
without notice, unfixed works are not necessarily free for all to use.
Second, even if unfixed works were immediately thrust into the
public domain, it is unclear how valuable that would be. After all, under 1909 law, consumers could readily determine which works were
free for all to use. A consumer had only to inspect the published work
and determine whether it had adequate notice. If it did not, that work

189. The renewal provisions were equally tricky, and they had a similar effect. For example,
Frank Capra’s classic film, It’s a Wonderful Life, fell into the public domain because the company that held its copyright failed to file a renewal application during the film’s twenty-eighth
year of protection. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 156, at 355 (explaining that the film
production company that held the copyright was bankrupt at the time the renewal was to be
filed).
190. Most industrialized nations and many developing countries are signatories to the Berne
Convention, a multilateral treaty that, among other things, forbids formalities that might make
it difficult for foreign authors to qualify for copyright protection in member nations. See Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24,
1971, art. 5(2), 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1346, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 233. Several statutes have gradually adjusted United States law to meet obligations under the Berne Convention, most prominently the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
191. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1).
192. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
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193
was probably in the public domain. Unfixed works, by contrast, are
not readily identified. A patron at a playhouse, for example, has no
way of knowing whether the play was written out beforehand or is,
instead, completely unfixed. Similarly, an audience member at a comedy performance can never be sure that the performance is not being
audiotaped from backstage. Thus, fixation does not seem to be a particularly helpful mechanism by which to increase the public domain,
because consumers would never know which works are, and which
works are not, free for use.
Lastly, several sources suggest that the real purpose of the fixation requirement is to narrow copyright’s purview. The court in Fal194
well v. Penthouse International, Ltd. raised this point, worrying that,
if copyright were to include unfixed expression, “every utterance”
would be protected, and “the courts would be inundated” with copyright claims.195 “[S]uch a result would run counter to the firmly established constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
196
press.” Professor Wendy Gordon has similarly argued that fixation
serves to distinguish protected expression from “the ordinary stream
of speech,” in that way making sure that copyright applies only to a
“limited set of intellectual products.”197
This rationale has some force, but, as with several of the others,
this one is vulnerable to the criticism that fixation is not a very limiting doctrine. So much expression is fixed—personal correspondence,
school reports, even messages left upon telephone answering ma-

193. The 1909 Act excused some accidental omissions of copyright notice, 17 U.S.C. § 21
(repealed 1976), so, in some cases, a consumer could pick up a copy of a work, see no copyright
notice, duplicate the work, and still turn out to have infringed copyright. Instances of this sort
were rare, however, because courts refused to recognize this statutory exception in cases where
the omission was due to “neglect or oversight,” Sieff v. Cont’l Auto Supply, Inc., 39 F. Supp.
683, 688 (D. Minn. 1941), or due to mistake of law, Wildman v. N.Y. Times, 42 F. Supp. 412, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1941). Even in cases where accidental omission was excused, however, alleged infringers were only liable to the extent that they had actual notice of the relevant copyright. As a
functional matter, then, these works were in the public domain.
Note that federal copyright law ultimately adopted a more forgiving policy than that
available under 1909 law. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 405 creates exceptions for de minimis omissions and for works registered within five years of any omission, and 17 U.S.C. § 401 fully eliminates the notice requirement for all works published after 1989.
194. 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981).
195. Id. at 1207.
196. Id. at 1208.
197. Wendy Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1382 (1989); see also Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 252–56 (N.Y. 1968) (raising similar concerns
about recognizing copyright in unfixed expression).
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chines—that it simply does not resonate to say that fixation is designed to solve the problem of an overly inclusive copyright regime.
The notice requirement was a valuable limiting doctrine in that it actually did serve to exclude from copyright all sorts of casual expression that was not disseminated with copyright in mind. But fixation is
much less effective in that it cuts out only a tiny fraction of the relevant expression. Thus, while this argument is correct as far as it goes,
it does not seem to go very far toward explaining the fixation requirement.
C. The Evidence Theory
Several commentators have previously suggested that the fixation requirement is in reality motivated by evidentiary concerns.
“One of the most important reasons for requiring fixation . . . as a
condition precedent to copyright protection is to ensure that a copyright claimant will be able to provide a court documentary evidence
198
of the copyrightable subject matter,” writes one commentator.
Without fixation, “copyright law would forever be mired in disputes
over the definition and boundaries of the works claiming copyright
199
protection,” suggests another. Professor Marshall Leaffer’s copyright treatise puts it this way: “[W]hen a work is embodied in a tangible medium of expression, one can point to something, enabling a
court to determine whether infringement has taken place.”200 A guide
to the requirements of the Berne Convention published by the World
Intellectual Property Organization similarly offers that the purpose of
the fixation requirement is to “prove[] the existence of the work.”201
The popularity of the evidence theory is easy to understand.
Copyright endeavors to protect an intangible—“expression”—yet intangibles by their very nature raise difficult issues with respect to
proof. It is not surprising, then, that an evidentiary justification is ascribed to the one copyright doctrine that associates the intangible
with some form of a tangible medium. Much as a patent marks the
198. Russ VerSteeg, Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: Jurimetric Copyright: Future
Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 132 (1994); see also ROBERT
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 367 (2d ed.
2000) (asserting that a “persuasive argument for fixation” is that it “helps in proving authorship”).
199. Donat, supra note 146, at 1400.
200. LEAFFER, supra note 90, at 55–56.
201. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 18 (1978).
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boundaries of a claimed invention, and a deed makes clear the borders associated with land, a fixation makes plain what is being
202
claimed and allows that claim to be recorded as of a certain date.
The evidence rationale resonates for another reason, too: in
copyright, it is critically important to know the exact content of protected expression. Close is simply not good enough, and the reason is
copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy. As readers familiar with copyright law already know, copyright protects only the expression of an
203
idea, not the idea itself. For example, Alice Sebold’s copyright in
the book, The Lovely Bones, recognizes in Sebold certain exclusive
rights with respect to her specific language, her particular characters,
her exact settings, and so on; but the copyright does not give her any
protection for the broad concept of a story where the main character
has moved on to the afterlife and narrates the book as events continue to unfold on Earth. Copyright, in other words, recognizes rights
in the narrow, concrete, expressive embodiment of an idea but leaves
the idea itself free for all to use.204
This links in with evidentiary concerns as follows. If the federal
copyright regime were forgiving when it came to evidentiary issues,
the boundaries of any given copyright claim would be unsure. That
would be troubling, because the whole point of the idea/expression
dichotomy is to recognize rights in the specific expression an author
uses to write, sing, or code his inspiration, all without granting rights
to the abstract ideas communicated thereby. Without solid evidence,
however, expression blurs into idea. Think of a copyright claim re-

202. Professor Wendy Gordon expands on this basic point as applied to several areas of intellectual property law. See Gordon, supra note 197, at 1381–83 (“Although they are not physically ‘crossable,’ the fixation and marking requirements and the limits on protectable intellectual products and copyright owners’ rights function as boundaries in the same way as the edges
on personal property or physical boundaries around realty do.”). Notice, however, that much of
copyright law is focused on the exact opposite task: that of trying to disassociate the intangible
from its tangible embodiment. Section 202 of the 1976 Act, for example, announces that “ownership of a copyright . . . is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is
embodied,” thus establishing both that the copyright owner does not own all embodiments of
his work and that a party who happens to own an embodiment of the work does not necessarily
also hold copyright in that work. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). This had previously been a contentious
issue in cases in which one party held possession of the first embodiment of another party’s expression. See, e.g., Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 605–06 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument by the owner of a band’s demo tapes that ownership of the original fixation carries with
it ownership of the associated copyright).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
204. Obviously, the idea/expression dichotomy is more of a vague spectrum than a precise
line. For a fuller introduction, see LEAFFER, supra note 90, at 77–90.
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lated to a professor’s unfixed lectures. Give that lecture enough times,
and the overlapping claims begin more and more to approximate the
underlying idea. “Transaction costs are a bitch,” becomes the copyrighted intuition, not the details of the particular professor’s eloquent
expression thereof. In short, the idea/expression dichotomy cannot
operate at a high level of imprecision, hence evidentiary concerns are
205
of particular importance for copyright.
The fixation requirement works to address this evidentiary
problem, although the logic here is a little less straightforward than it
might at first appear. The wrinkle is that the fixation requirement
does not serve evidentiary goals by encouraging authors to fix their
expression. True, encouraging fixation would serve evidentiary goals.
But, as a practical matter, the fixation requirement probably does not
encourage fixation. Even without the fixation requirement, fixation is
already cheap, easy, and significantly in an author’s own interest. The
legal requirement is thus superfluous when it comes to incentives;
even without the added pressure of the requirement, there is a sufficiently strong incentive to fix, and any author who thinks of it will do
so regardless of the legal rule. What the fixation requirement does accomplish is to serve as a prophylactic remedy in cases where there
never was any physical evidence of the claimed expression. The fixation requirement excludes these cases from consideration. The reasoning is the same as that articulated with respect to uncreative
works: in these cases, the social costs of litigation likely exceed the social benefits derived from offering copyright protection in the first
place.
Of course, if the fixation requirement really is best understood as
a rule designed to address evidentiary issues, the modern requirement
has been implemented in a shockingly unambitious fashion. The
trouble is that the modern requirement excludes only those cases
where there never was any physical evidence of the claimed expression; it does not exclude cases where there was evidence at some
point in time, but that evidence was later lost or destroyed. Stated another way, federal law requires that fixations survive for a period of
“more than transitory duration,” but it does not require that fixations
survive, say, until the moment of litigation.206 So, if a work was fixed in

205. Thanks to Professor James Boyle for a helpful exchange on this point.
206. One way to implement such a rule would be to say that copyright expires at the earlier
of two dates: the date specified under the current duration provision, 17 U.S.C. § 302, or the
date that the fixation is destroyed.
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paper form in 1980, but the relevant papers were destroyed in 1981,
modern law would nevertheless deem the work to be sufficiently fixed
to support litigation in 1982 or even 1990. From an evidentiary perspective, this is difficult to defend. There is barely any difference between a case where there was never any fixation at all, and a case
where there was a fixation that was destroyed before the relevant litigation commenced. Yet that is exactly the line drawn by the modern
fixation requirement.
One can offer a halfhearted justification, namely, that addressing
these additional issues would require a more complicated fixation
rule. For instance, because copyright terms today extend so long, and
tangible objects naturally degrade over time, lawmakers might be reluctant to adopt a fixation rule that simply required, without exception, that fixations survive until the moment of litigation. Such a rule
would serve evidentiary goals, but it would also punish authors whose
works were lost through accident or natural wear, and it would thus
have the practical effect of (randomly) shortening copyright duration.
To avoid these effects, the rule would have to carve out exceptions.
For example, perhaps the rule would require authors to exert “reasonable efforts” to protect at least one fixation throughout the copyright term, thereby excusing authors whose fixations naturally degrade, but requiring authors in normal circumstances to either
preserve their work or forfeit protection. Alternatively, the law could
require survival but allow the requirement to be satisfied by the continued existence of any fixation, no matter whether it is the original
fixation or a duplicate thereof. For published works, this would represent a significant relaxation of the otherwise harsh rule because, upon
publication, typically a large number of fixed copies are produced and
disseminated, and it would be the unusual case where all of those embodiments were destroyed.
Any of these rules would serve evidentiary goals better than the
current rule, and the only drawback is that they would entail at least
slightly increased administrative costs. If those costs are not justified,
one can understand why modern law takes the unambitious position it
takes. But that, in turn, calls the fixation requirement itself into question. Either there are significant efficiencies to be gained by excluding
cases where there is no meaningful physical evidence, and, hence, the
modern rule plus these more complicated adjustments are all likely
justified; or all of this is small potatoes and fixation should therefore
not be required. But the current position—to exclude cases where
there is absolutely no physical evidence but welcome cases where the
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evidence existed for any period of more than transitory duration—
seems an untenable middle ground, unsupported by the evidence
207
rationale, or, indeed, any of the rationales surveyed in this section.
III. OTHER COPYRIGHT DOCTRINES
The previous Parts combined to take an in-depth look at the two
main prerequisites to copyright protection: the requirement that a
work be original, and the requirement that a work be fixed in tangible
form. This Part offers a lighter survey of three additional copyright
doctrines on which the evidence theory sheds light: the merger doctrine, the doctrine of scènes à faire, and the federal registration procedure. In each case, I argue that, while the doctrine at issue might
additionally serve other purposes, one primary function is to discourage litigation in instances where evidentiary concerns would otherwise overwhelm.
A. The Merger Doctrine
As I discuss briefly in Part II.C, a basic principle of copyright law
is that copyright protects only the expression of an idea, not the idea
208
itself. An author who writes a book on how to lose weight, for example, can invoke copyright to protect her particular turns of phrase,
but she cannot invoke copyright to protect the actual weight loss
strategy she describes. Similarly—and this is the example I used earlier—Alice Sebold’s copyright in the book, The Lovely Bones, recog207. One possible explanation for the current fixation requirement might be that this is the
best that Congress can do. After all, the constitutional term “writings” has been interpreted to
require some form of a physical manifestation. Congress cannot completely eliminate the fixation requirement, then, and Congress might thus have chosen to do the next best thing: adopt
the weakest fixation requirement imaginable, namely, one that recognizes as fixed any work
that is even briefly captured in physical form. This explanation is consistent with the sweeping
language currently in effect, both in section 102, which states that acceptable media include
those “now known or later developed, from which [expression] can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device,” 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a), and in section 101, which defines as fixed any expression that is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration,” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine more permissive definitions than these that would still pass constitutional muster.
208. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. This distinction is today codified at 17
U.S.C. § 102(b), but it was an integral principle long before. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 103 (1879) (“[W]here the art [a copyrighted book] teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such
methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public . . . .”).
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nizes in Sebold certain exclusive rights with respect to her specific
language, her particular characters, her particular settings, and so on;
but the copyright does not give her any protection for the broad concept of a story narrated from the afterlife.
The merger doctrine supplements this basic distinction between
idea and expression. It states that copyright protection will be denied
209
in instances where there are only a few ways to express a given idea.
That is, contrary to the general rule, in these cases even expression
will not be protected. If there is only one way to articulate a given
idea,210 or if there are only a handful of ways to articulate that idea, no
211
one can protect any of the available alternatives. Expression and
idea are said to “merge.” Courts typically explain that protection is
denied in order to “prevent an author from monopolizing an idea
merely by copyrighting a few expressions of it.”212
The merger doctrine originated with the First Circuit decision in
213
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co. In dispute was the copyright associated with the rules for the plaintiff’s “sweepstakes” promotional
contest. The defendant attempted to conduct the same basic promotion, and the plaintiff sued on the ground that the defendant had

209. See, e.g., Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., 89 F.3d 614, 617–18 (9th Cir. 1996)
(applying the merger doctrine to prevent copyright of the underlying ideas in a series of academic games, because the expression of the rules of the games could not be distinguished from
the idea of the games themselves); Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1076 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that the merger doctrine did not apply to prevent the copyright of a nine-pointed star
illustrating personality traits, because there were many other ways to illustrate the nine traits).
210. In cases where there is only one way to express the idea, some copyright authorities
identify the doctrine as “the doctrine of Baker v. Selden,” in that way reserving the term
“merger” for cases where there are only a few, but more than one, ways of expressing the idea.
See, e.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 115, at § 2.18[B]–[D] (explaining the basic merger
principle set forth in Baker v. Selden, and providing illustrations of how subsequent courts have
enlarged upon it).
211. There is an ongoing circuit split over whether merger is a bar to copyright eligibility in
the first instance or, instead, an affirmative defense that must be raised against a specific charge
of infringement. Compare Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458,
1460 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that, because the idea and its expression merge, “the maps at issue
are not copyrightable”) with Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the merger doctrine to “determin[e] whether actionable infringement has occurred,
rather than whether a copyright is valid”). While practical implications do attach to this distinction, none are relevant to the discussion here.
212. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986). Several courts have
picked up this exact language. E.g., Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir.
1992); Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 884 F. Supp. 71, 76 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Fin. Control Assoc. v. Equity Builders, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1103, 1118 (N.D. Kan. 1992).
213. 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967).
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214
copied the plaintiff’s rules. The claim was plausible. The defendant,
for example, had published a rule stating that entrants “should print
name, address and Social Security number on a Tide boxtop, or on
plain paper,”215 whereas the plaintiff’s rule had required that entrants
“should print name, address and social security number on a boxtop,
216
or a plain paper.”
A traditional copyright response to the case would have been to
recognize copyright in the plaintiff’s expression, but to announce that
the defendant was free to copy the underlying idea. This would have
made it impermissible for the defendant to copy the rules but perfectly acceptable for the defendant to run a similar or identical contest. The court refused to take this approach, however, worrying that
protecting the expression in this instance would inevitably protect the
idea, too. Wrote the court:

When the uncopyrightable [idea] is very narrow, so that the topic
necessarily requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only
a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or
parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all
217
possibilities of future use of the [idea].

This the court would not allow. Copyright, the court explained, was
218
not “a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.”
In the years since Morrissey, the merger doctrine has been fre219
quently invoked. In Allen v. Academic Games League of America,
for example, it was applied to limit the protection offered a variety of
educational board games on the ground that the rules for the games
220
and the ideas behind the games would in certain instances merge. In
221
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., it was similarly
applied to limit the protection offered to computer programs, the argument being that there are only a limited number of ways to effi222
ciently code particular functions and concepts. And in Tensor

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 676.
Id. at 678 (emphasis and alterations omitted).
Id.
Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
Id. at 679.
89 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 617–18.
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 707–08.
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223
Group, Inc. v. Global Web Systems, Inc., the court struggled to decide whether merger should be invoked to deny copyright to engineering drawings, the logic this time being that there are just a limited
number of ways to faithfully represent a complicated machine.224 In all
of these cases, the same concern drives the analysis. Where there are
only a few ways to express a given idea, courts worry that “rigorously
protecting the expression [will] confer a monopoly over the idea itself,” a result directly contrary to the fundamental principle that
copyright does not protect ideas.225
This standard account of the merger doctrine says nothing about
evidence. Yet I submit that the merger doctrine is at least in part motivated by an evidentiary concern. Think again about Morrissey. Why
was the court in that case so reluctant to recognize copyright in the
plaintiff’s expression? The court says that “by copyrighting a mere
handful of forms, [the plaintiff] could exhaust all possibilities of fu226
ture use” of the sweepstakes idea. But that is not true. Copyright
would not have stopped the defendant from hearing about the plaintiff’s sweepstakes promotion and then coming up with its own rules.
Copyright would only have stopped the defendant from copying the
plaintiff’s rules. Indeed, just as readers of the Sebold book are allowed to write their own stories about life after death, the defendant
would have been perfectly free to conduct an identical contest promotion. All that the defendant would not have been allowed to do was
copy the plaintiff’s expression.
But the court rejected this approach on the ground that there are
only a few ways to express the sweepstakes idea. Why does this matter? Evidence. If the defendant in Morrissey had done exactly what
traditional analysis would have allowed him to do—if he had borrowed the idea, but then written his own expression—he would still
likely have ended up with expression that looked an awful lot like the
plaintiff’s expression. As the court pointed out, there are only a few

223. No. 96-C-4606, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,596 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1998).
224. Id. at *3–5.
225. Marshall & Swift v. BS&A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952, 961 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (quoting
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 115, § 13.03[B][3]); Fin. Control Assocs., Inc. v. Equity
Builders, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1103, 1118 (D. Kansas 1992) (same); see also Genesee Brewing Co.
v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 147 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that merger operates when
“protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the idea itself” (citations
omitted)); Warren Publ’g v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1518 n.27 (11th Cir. 1997)
(same).
226. Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1967).
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ways to express this basic idea. That would have led to an evidentiary
quagmire. The defendant’s expression would have looked similar to
the plaintiff’s, and the court would have been hard-pressed to determine whether that similarity was evidence of impermissible copying
or, instead, innocent happenstance given the limited number of options available.
This is a problem that applies generally to merger cases. Courts
cannot reliably distinguish permissible from impermissible behavior
in these instances because, no matter what, the resulting expression
will typically look the same. So of course courts worry that protection
of expression in these cases will “effectively accord protection” to the
relevant underlying ideas. Without the merger doctrine, courts in
some number of cases would mistakenly find impermissible copying
where, in truth, only the unprotected idea was taken. As a practical
matter, that would restrict the use of ideas in these settings. Merger
thus denies protection in cases where there are only a limited number
of expressive options.
B. Scènes à Faire
Copyright does not protect “stock” or standard literary devices.
For example, no one can claim rights to a shadowy private investigator who wears a trenchcoat, smokes cigarettes, and enjoys a certain
rapport with female clients, nor can anyone claim protection for
stereotypical dramatic elements like the use of military slogans, flags,
and armored vehicles as a backdrop for a motion picture about war.
Courts refer to these unprotected elements as “scènes à faire,” a
French term that literally translates to mean “scenes which ‘must’ be
227
done.” A common definition states that these are “incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at
least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.”228 This is a courtmade doctrine, typically explained by the observation that “it is virtually impossible to write about [certain] historical era[s] or fictional
theme[s]” without sometimes employing standard characters and mo229
tifs.
227. Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
228. E.g., Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 742 (2d Cir. 1991) (Van Graafeiland,
J., concurring); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
1982); Churchill Livingstone, Inc. v. Williams & Wilkins, 949 F. Supp. 1045, 1052 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
229. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“Because it is virtually impossible to write about a particular historical era or fictional theme
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There are two main reasons why a sensible copyright regime
would deny protection to scènes à faire. One is that, by making it easy
for authors to rely on familiar and well-worn elements, the doctrine
helps authors communicate basic information to their readers quickly.
An author does not need to invest any energy coming up with his own
background characters or suggestive details; an author can borrow
familiar elements from other sources, and thereby readily set the
stage for whatever new material the author wishes to contribute. This
justification frames the doctrine as a subsidy to writers; the costs of
original expression are lower because familiar background characters
and scenes can be borrowed without worry from preexisting sources.
The second reason, however, is evidence. If authors were allowed
to copyright stock characters and settings, courts would frequently
find themselves facing the by-now-familiar evidentiary puzzle: upon
seeing two works with similar expressive elements, courts would find
it difficult to determine whether there was impermissible copying of
those elements, or whether, instead, any similarities innocently derive
from the fact that, in both instances, the overlapping details flow
naturally from the setting at issue. Like the merger doctrine, then, the
doctrine of scènes à faire excludes these troubling cases from the
copyright regime.
C. Registration
Sections 408 through 412 of the Copyright Act combine to offer
authors the option of registering their works with the Copyright Of230
fice. Registration involves the payment of a modest fee, the deposit
of (usually) two copies of the work, and the submission of an application that reveals some basic information about the work, such as the
name of its author and the date on which it was completed.231 Registration is not an evaluative process. While the Register of Copyright
can deny registration in instances where the Register believes the
work is ineligible for protection,232 in general the Register just archives copyright applications and defers to the courts any serious
evaluation of copyright claims.
without employing certain ‘stock’ or standard literary devices, we have held that scènes à faire
are not copyrightable as a matter of law.”).
230. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408–412 (2000).
231. These requirements are set out in the statute. For example, 17 U.S.C. § 409 lists the
categories of information that an applicant must disclose on a registration form, and 17 U.S.C.
§ 408 explains the deposit requirement as it applies in the context of registration.
232. 17 U.S.C. § 410(b).
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For authors, there are two primary benefits to registration. First,
an author who registers his work within five years of its first publication enjoys certain evidentiary presumptions as to the validity of his
copyright and the accuracy of the information supplied on his applica233
tion. This makes it easier for the author to win any later infringement action. Second, registration qualifies an author to pursue additional remedies with respect to infringements that take place after
registration.234 For example, an author who has registered his work
has the option of pursuing statutory damages instead of actual dam235
ages, and such an author can also recover attorney’s fees. These expanded remedies are particularly valuable in cases where actual dam236
ages would be difficult to prove with sufficient specificity.
There are a number of possible explanations for the registration
procedure. For example, I pointed out earlier that copyright law
might want to distinguish authors whose expressive activities are motivated by copyright from authors for whom copyright was an after237
thought. Drawing this sort of distinction is desirable because, while
copyright is likely worth its costs in instances where it encourages expressive production, copyright might not be worthwhile in cases
where the promise of protection does not increase the incentive to
create. Registration partially accomplishes this goal by offering expanded remedies to authors who signal, through registration, that
copyright is important to them. Registration is not an extreme approach in that even unregistered works are protected, but registration
does distinguish between the two categories of authors, and, thus, it
furthers the goal of calibrating the level of protection to the likely incentive effect.
Another virtue of registration is that it increases the nation’s cultural archive. By conditioning various advantages on registration,
233. Id. § 410(c).
234. Id. § 412. A work that is registered within three months of its first publication enjoys
the full protection of a registered work even if the infringement at issue occurred prior to registration. Id. § 412(2).
235. Id. § 412.
236. Although not discussed in the text, note that registration is, as a technical matter, a precondition to the filing of almost any infringement action. Id. § 411. This is not discussed, however, because it is in reality just a formality. Right before a litigant files suit, he can submit the
appropriate materials to the Copyright Office. Thus, in practical effect, copyright litigation begins with the submission of a form to the Copyright Office and then proceeds with the normal
progression of filings to the appropriate court.
237. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (offering this as a possible rationale for the
fixation requirement).
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modern law encourages authors to submit copies of their works to the
Copyright Office. From there, many of these works are passed along
to the Library of Congress, and, in turn, made available to the public.
True, registration could accomplish this even more effectively by requiring that all works be registered; but, as was noted earlier, modern
copyright law is reluctant to impose strict requirements for fear that
they will trip up foreign authors and authors who are not well versed
in the nuances of the law. Most of copyright law is thus implemented
through carrots, not sticks, and, on this view, registration is consistent
with the overall approach of the law.
Registration can also be at least in part explained by reference to
evidentiary issues. The presumptions that take hold if a work is registered within five years of its first publication make it easier for the
relevant copyright holders to litigate their cases. Cases where the
work was not registered within five years of publication, conversely,
are much harder to win. The presumptions thus have the effect of discouraging litigation in cases where there is not good evidence—
namely, cases where either (1) no copy of the work was deposited, or
(2) a copy was deposited, but only after a long time had passed since
the work was first made public. Note that, unlike all of the previous
copyright doctrines considered, registration does not exclude cases
that lack good evidence. Instead, registration simply sets the
evidentiary burdens so as to discourage litigation in these instances.
Some courts and commentators have argued that registration
does not serve an evidentiary purpose because the Copyright Office is
238
not obligated to preserve copies of all registered works. Section
704(d) explicitly states that copies of published works need only be
maintained for “the longest period considered practicable and desirable by the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress,”239
and in 1983 the Copyright Office announced that, due to a lack of
storage space, published works would typically be discarded after five
240
years. These limitations admittedly lessen the evidentiary value of
the registration procedure, but that effect should not be overstated.
First, an archive for published works is only so important because, by
238. See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d
478, 485 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Deposited copies may be destroyed . . . and this is incompatible with
the notion that copies are now required in order that the subject matter of protected works may
always be available for information and to prevent unconscious infringement.”).
239. 17 U.S.C. § 704(d).
240. Policy Statement on Deposit Retention Schedule, 48 Fed. Reg. 12,862, 12,862 (Mar. 28,
1983).
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definition, copies of published works are widely available, and, thus,
there is naturally good evidence available with respect to these works.
Second, the rules about discarding deposited works do not apply to
unpublished works. For unpublished works, the evidentiary value of
registration is greater, and the statute correspondingly requires that
the copies not be “knowingly or intentionally destroyed” during the
241
copyright term unless a duplicate copy is archived.
CONCLUSION
This Article set out to explore an evidentiary perspective on
copyright law and, more importantly, to argue that copyright’s
threshold inquiries into originality and fixation serve important evidentiary goals. The main implications are two: first, that copyright
needlessly denies protection to databases and other factual material;
second, that the modern fixation requirement should either be taken
more seriously or completely discarded.
This Article has a secondary purpose, however, and that is to expose a problem of increasing import to federal copyright law: copyright doctrines today each serve so many different functions that they
have become almost uselessly imprecise. That is, while doctrines like
originality, fixation, and scènes à faire might once have been valuable
shorthands for particular policy arguments, to invoke one of these
doctrines today communicates almost no information. Originality, for
example, is sometimes about the costs of expression, sometimes about
the value of expression, sometimes about the importance of public
access, and, yes, sometimes about evidence. Courts almost never
make clear which issue is at play.
The quality of copyright decisions could be dramatically improved if courts were to take serious interest in articulating the logical
justifications for the copyright doctrines they invoke. For instance, if
the doctrine of scènes à faire is going to serve as the shorthand for
several different policy rationales, that might be fine, but courts invoking the doctrine should then further specify which specific set of
issues and arguments they mean to call to mind. Alternatively, the
doctrine could be matured to match up with only one policy rationale,
leaving separate doctrines to be associated with whatever policy arguments remain.
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The imprecision of the current approach is hard to defend, and,
indeed, dangerous to the functioning of the law. It is at least in part to
blame for what has happened to the originality requirement; that doctrine was once a potentially valuable proxy for rational policy goals
but today invites a meaningless hunt for creativity itself. It similarly
has undermined the fixation requirement. The modern fixation requirement is associated with over a half dozen rationales; lost in an
identity crisis, it serves none of them well. In short, doctrines that accrue multiple meanings in time can end up with no meaning at all.
This is the warning implicit in the story of the originality and fixation
requirements, and it is the secondary theme of this Article.

